

LIAISON

VOLUME IX | SPRING 2017

A JOURNAL OF CIVIL-MILITARY DISASTER MANAGEMENT & HUMANITARIAN RELIEF COLLABORATIONS

Shaping Phase Zero

**How the Military,
Humanitarians &
Private Sector
Prepare
for Disasters**

Pacific Partnership
in the Philippines

The Private Sector Role
in Disaster Management

Applying Civil-
Military Lessons in
Myanmar

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
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The Director's Letter

Joseph Martin, SES

United States Pacific Command has not conducted a major disaster response in the Asia-Pacific region since Spring 2015. Whereas elements of the command have provided support to major earthquakes in Japan and New Zealand, a significant international deployment of military and civilian assets has been largely absent in the region for nearly two years. While we are grateful for this period of calm, those who respond to catastrophic disasters are keenly aware of the history of the region. For disasters – this is Phase 0.

Given that the likelihood of a back-to-back crisis is low, there is a natural tendency after a major incident to simply take a break. However, it is in this period of relative “calm after the storm” that the most progress can be made in preparedness. Militarily, we refer to the planning period prior to an event loosely as Phase 0. It is when you prepare, plan and practice. For example, after the Nepal earthquake, the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance was tasked to produce the After Action Report for U.S. Pacific Command. That product took six months to deliver, and the command took actions on many suggestions very quickly. Since then, the command and its components have executed a long series of multinational training and exercise activities with partners based in part on those lessons.

This issue of the Liaison looks across the spectrum of Phase 0 activities ranging from international ex-



ercises in Europe to better preparing Myanmar's armed forces for disaster response. Included in these pages are a broad range of preparatory activities that are each intended to better prepare organizations, local communities, and entire countries for the next catastrophe. Improved resilience through these types of actions has been proven to reduce the need for outside assistance across the span of disaster scenarios. An added benefit is also the corresponding improvement to the daily lives and sense of safety in the communities involved when infrastructure improvements are completed, such as with the Bangladesh road story (see page 18).

This broad stroke of military, business, and international relief agency activities barely scratches the surface of what occurs in Phase 0. The intent of these examples, and relevant interviews with regional leaders, is to provide a basis to continue these activities and appreciate their tangible benefits before the next disaster occurs.

Aloha,

LIAISON

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LIAISON welcomes article submissions

LIAISON is a journal of civil-military disaster management and humanitarian relief collaborations and aims to engage and inform readers on the most current research, collaborations and lessons learned available. If you are interested in submitting an article for consideration, please email your story idea to editor@cfe-dmha.org.

•**Format.** All submissions should be emailed to the editor as an unformatted Microsoft Word file. Footnotes are the preferred method of citation, if applicable, and please attach any images within the document as separate files as well.

•**Provide original research or reporting.** LIAISON prefers original submissions, but if your article or paper is being considered for publication elsewhere, please note that with the submission. Previously published articles or papers will be considered if they are relevant to the issue topic.

•**Clarity and scope.** Please avoid technical acronyms and language. The majority of LIAISON readers are from Asia-Pacific nations and articles should be addressed to an international audience. Articles should also be applicable to partners in organizations or nations beyond that of the author. The aim is for successful cases to aid other partners of the disaster management and humanitarian community.

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•**Supporting imagery.** Original imagery supporting any and all articles is welcome. Please ensure the images are high-resolution and can be credited to the photographer without license infringement. Images should be attached to the submission separately, not embedded within the Microsoft Word document.

•**Biography and photo.** When submitting an article, please include a short biography and high-resolution photo of yourself for the contributors' section.


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
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
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The humanitarians were quickly escorted off the bus and surrounded by uniformed police with dogs on tight leashes. The dogs were led along the rows of bags and paraded next to the standing newcomers. The group was shuffled into a long, single line for entry into the dilapidated airfield hangar where an immigration counter had been set up. One policeman approached an aid worker and under his breath offered his assistance in getting the man to the front of the line for a small fee. The aid worker did his best

A MODEL FOR HADR EXERCISES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC?

*By Jesse Wolfe, Associate Surge Pool,
U.N. Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs*

to deflect as the policeman persisted. After it was clear the man was unwilling to compromise his principles, at least while wearing his organizations trademark vest and in view of his colleagues, the policeman walked away to find someone more accommodating. Once inside the hangar stress levels only increased as passport pages were flipped back and forth in the hopes that some real or imagined transgression might emerge necessitating a delay in visa processing and perhaps an additional fee to get things in order. The quick punch of the visa stamp in the passport was a momentary release of anxiety for each aid worker.

The relief was short-lived as securing transportation amidst a shortage of vehicles and limited communications proved to be even more difficult. As small groups huddled together protectively and those with phones tried to connect with points of contact, international media pursued idle targets of opportunity to inquire about the slowness of the response and why the aid was not moving faster. Each time a caravan of SUVs pulled up outside, the humanitarians





Four UNOCHA civil-military coordination officers led meetings in the Humanitarian-Military Operations Coordination Center (HuMOCC) during TRIPLEX 2016 in Norway.

pressed forward in hopes it was their escape. It had only just begun, but for those who had never deployed on a disaster response mission, they were already counting down the hours of this four-day intensive exercise known as TRIPLEX.

Held once every three years, TRIPLEX is one of the largest humanitarian field exercises in the world.

In September 2016 approximately 36 organizations with over 200 participants from more than 70 countries converged on a World War II era airbase in Lista, Norway to test humanitarian coordination mechanisms. United Nations agencies, European Union Civil Protection Mechanism, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, nongovernmental organizations, donor agencies, the International Humanitarian Partnership (IHP), MapAction, representatives from the private sector, and civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) officers from NATO countries were represented. In a field

of continuous resource constraints, high operational demands, and diverse stakeholders, humanitarian organizations have few opportunities globally to come together for large-scale exercises. TRIPLEX is a unique and valuable opportunity for humanitarian professionals, yet revealing in how little it considered military support critical to natural disaster response operations. The military inclusion that did occur was limited to the handful of NATO CIMIC officers which were largely not utilized due to the scenario scripting their assets as being in transit for the duration of the exercise. Even the fictional “Sorland” national military, which represented the affected state for the exercise, was mysteriously pre-occupied with pressing matters elsewhere and played no role in the response effort. However, despite this tepid inclusion of a military role, TRIPLEX offers a model for Asia-Pacific militaries to significantly improve the often stale HADR-focused exercises drawn from recycled scenario templates and involving a drastically under-represented humanitarian dimension.

Although the customs and immigration process was the first phase of the field exercise and designed to provide an authentic, but seemingly worst-case disaster response experience, TRIPLEX 2016 had started two days earlier. The exercise began with a series of mini-workshops focused on relevant topics including: field coordination, supply chain of pandemic response, state of the art assessment, emergency medical teams, camp and shelter, use of UAVs, and academia meets operations. These sessions offered the participants an opportunity to network and capitalize on the different organizational perspectives, and inform discussions about current challenges in the ever-evolving professional humanitarian field. TRIPLEX 2016 was as much an international conference as it was an exercise with informational booths also set up to distribute brochures and reports.



Photos courtesy of IHP

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) served as the Secretariat for the exercise and had a leading role in its conduct. A central piece of TRIPLEX 2016 was testing the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team. The UNDAC is the team typically responsible for setting up the On-Site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC) in a disaster response. With approximately 20 team members, the UNDAC was one of the larger cohesive elements of the exercise. Notably the UNDAC team in TRIPLEX 2016 contained a UNOCHA Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN CMCoord) component consisting of four UNOCHA CMCoord Officers.

The UNOCHA CMCoord team established a Humanitarian-Military Operations Coordination Centre (HuMOCC). The HuMOCC, intended to be a supporting element to the OSOCC, served as a “dedicated space for humanitarian and military interaction” and facilitated requests for military assistance. Joining the four UNOCHA CMCoord officers were five liaison officers from military forces assisting in the response effort. The HuMOCC platform provided the following key coordination services:

1. A dedicated space and structure to facilitate the dialogue and interface between humanitarian and military actors;
2. A one-stop shop for humanitarian-civilian-military information exchange and update, task sharing and division, and shared/joint/transition planning, as appropriate;
3. Provide a platform for cluster representatives and military liaison officers to coordinate requests for military assets/capacity to support the priority humanitarian capacity gaps.

The HuMOCC as a physical center established during a response remains a contested concept even among humanitarian organizations. Some organizations perceive it as an intrusive and unnecessary assertion of UNOCHA’s mandate intended to establish UNOCHA as the single conduit for coordination; national government agencies often view it with suspicion as the U.N. usurping the country’s sovereignty and control of response operations; donor agencies see the HuMOCC as competing with their own established “lead federal agency” processes for coordinating utilization of unique and critical military capabilities during a response; military civil affairs officers question the need for the platform given their role in conducting civil-military coordination. While these are all legitimate concerns, they largely reflect misunderstanding of the HuMOCC purpose. Rather than mandating a physical “center”, the HuMOCC is primarily a concept intended to drive the vital function of bringing greater clarity, organization and efficiency to humanitarian civil-

military coordination. As long as this function is occurring there is nothing mandating a physical HuMOCC.

During TRIPLEX 2016 the HuMOCC was co-located with the OSOCC in side-by-side tents. The five military liaison officers and four UNOCHA CMCoord officers convened a daily HuMOCC meeting attended by donor agencies, cluster leads and the national military liaison officer. The military liaison officers provided the CMCoord representatives updates on the location and type of resources the military was contributing to the response. Additionally, the CMCoord officers attended the different humanitarian cluster meetings to ensure they had the latest information on identified needs and, as appropriate, bring awareness of the unique capabilities the military had to support the humanitarian organizations.

Over the course of the four-day exercise there were few requests for military assistance that trickled into the HuMOCC and those requests came primarily toward the last 24 hours. This was in part due to the exercise beginning at the initial phase of a disaster response with teams just arriving in the affected area and no acceleration of a timeline or injects that advanced the need for more coordination to occur. The UNDAC team and various NGOs were heavily consumed with conducting needs assessments and then developing their strategies for providing assistance, not reaching a stage that military assistance was required. Unfortunately, this meant that the military liaison officers were underutilized in the exercise. Furthermore, as many of the humanitarian participants had minimal experience working with the military, the lack of injects requiring military assistance risked leaving the impression that during a disaster response militaries wait for requests from NGOs before responding. A more realistic scenario would have seen injects that demonstrated rapidly responding national and assisting state militaries that were already meeting critical infrastructure support and indirect assistance needs while the humanitarian organizations were still conducting their needs assessments.

Although the military dimension was lacking, the humanitarian organizations had a rich environment created for them. The cluster meetings were particularly well orchestrated by the exercise control group. Although there was a small role player element – primarily through the presence of a National Disaster Management Office (NDMO) representative – the meetings took on a life of their own through the robust participation of the different organizations involved. At some of the larger meetings, such as the Logistics Cluster meeting, the tent was filled to capacity as every organization attempted to gather key information as well as promote their equities in movement and distribution of their assistance.

This element of robust humanitarian representation and coordination is what is lacking in the large HADR military exercises held in the Asia-Pacific region, despite

OSLAND

Rotary Wing
4x MBB BO 105



Trucks
8x Scania
13x Container transportation means



Medical Supply




Water/Engineering Supply



FRANCE

Rotary Wing
16x NH-90



Ships
2x LCACs
2x Hovercrafts
1x Mistral



Medical Supply



WESLAND

Bridging
2x 70 T Pontoons



Trucks
10x Mortuary



Military assets deployed in support of disaster response in the fictional country of Sorland.

the fact that militaries and humanitarians operate in much closer proximity and alignment than anywhere else in the world. Most military-led disaster response exercises invite only a handful of United Nations, International Federation of Red Cross, and occasionally NGO representatives to participate. Like the military liaison officers in the TRIPLEX 2016 exercise, this results in a skewed perception regarding the scale of activity and expertise found in the professional humanitarian community during a response. Although the humanitarian cluster system is often mentioned in military exercises, it remains an ephemeral concept to most members of the military with no clear sense of how the individual cluster meetings function, who participates in them, what value they provide, or what role they play in the overall response.

The location for TRIPLEX 2019 remains to be determined; however, there were proposals to hold the next TRIPLEX in a non-European country that experiences frequent natural disasters. This would have the benefit of utilizing real national government ministries, NDMO and military participation rather than relying on role-players. The Asia-Pacific would be the ideal region to

NETHERLANDS

Bridging
2x CH-47



Ships
1x Rotterdam



UNITED KINGDOM

Ships
1x Rotterdam



Water/Engineering Supply



UNITED STATES

Ships
(Upon request)



host the exercise, and if partnered with an equally robust military participation, the outcome would be the world's largest humanitarian civil-military exercise testing the full spectrum of coordination platforms and agencies. As seen in recent years, the next mega-disaster in the Asia-Pacific will witness the full engagement of both humanitarian and military stakeholders; there is no reason we can't combine efforts to exercise the way we respond.



The Private Sector as a Key Actor in Disaster Management

*By Rene 'Butch' Meily, President,
Philippine Disaster Resilience Foundation*

On a Saturday morning in Manila in 2009, it rained. And rained. And rained. With no Doppler radars, there was no way to determine the intensity of the rain brought on by a typhoon. After many hours of thunderous water pouring from the sky, much of Metro Manila was flooded. Highways turned into rivers and many motorists were trapped in their cars and killed. Businesses, homes and lives were destroyed.

That tragedy gave birth to the Philippine Disaster Recovery Foundation (PDRF), a public-private sector partnership focused on disaster management and made up of some of the country's largest businesses. It serves as a neutral setting where even the fiercest commercial competitors can come together and channel their resources for a common cause.

Working closely with the Government, PDRF mobilized the Philippine private sector to rebuild classrooms and initiate the process that eventually led to a flood hazard map for Manila. Today, the Philippines

has 12 Doppler radars.

One of PDRF's founding members, Philippine Long Distance Telephone, laid fibre-optic cable enabling two important government agencies — the Office of Civil Defense and Pagasa, the government weather bureau — to communicate with one another for the first time via the Internet.

PDRF's most lasting project has been the reforestation of the Marikina watershed in the hills above Manila. A major cause of the flooding was the increasing loss of forest cover in the watershed area, covering thousands of hectares. The growing migration of rural folk to Manila was putting enormous pressure on the region. Inhabitants were chopping down trees to make charcoal in order to eke out a meager existence.

PDRF led a coalition of nongovernmental organizations and private firms headed by another of its member companies, Manila Water, to teach people the importance of protecting the environment and to establish alternative ways to make a living such as nurseries and making products like honey, lotion and herbal drinks. It hired upland residents to guard the

watershed against intrusions. The battle between urban development and saving the protected area continues with PDRF embarking on new strategies to save Marikina watershed.

In 2013, the Philippines suffered its 'annus horribilis'. In September, the city of Zamboanga located on the southern island of Mindanao was racked by three weeks of fighting due to a raid by rebels. In October, a 7.2-magnitude earthquake devastated the islands of Cebu and Bohol, destroying homes, schools and centuries-old churches. In November, super-typhoon Haiyan crushed much of the city of Tacloban and the surrounding region. Estimates of the dead ran into the thousands. A visiting ambassador compared the city to Hiroshima.

The three successive catastrophes, each of a different calibre and nature, rocked the country and challenged the capabilities of its government. One constant was the active participation of the Philippine private sector in galvanizing resources and helping rebuild a stricken country. PDRF was at the centre of the action. It became a major partner of the newly created Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (OPARR).

OPARR divided the areas affected by Haiyan into 26 zones, with various companies and PDRF assuming responsibility for the rehabilitation effort in each zone. Earlier, PDRF had created five clusters to help restore the damaged areas to normalcy — Education, Livelihood, Shelter, Environment, and Water, Infrastructure, Sanitation and Health (WISH). A sixth cluster, Disaster Preparedness, was set up with an eye to the future, with everyone realizing that the Philippines is a disaster-prone country, number two or three on most lists. Each cluster was headed by a seasoned corporate executive with various companies joining one grouping or the other.

Because of its credibility as an action-oriented organization led by some of the top chief executive officers in the country, PDRF received a great deal of support from both domestic and overseas donors including the sizeable Filipino diaspora community. A 14-year-old American from New Jersey raised money from his classmates to rebuild the Philippines, brick by brick with each brick costing a quarter. A high school teacher from Colorado spoke out about the super-typhoon's destruction and asked for donations.

Help.Ph, a text-based donation mechanism, was launched by another PDRF member, Smart Communications, and raised millions of pesos. Concerts were staged with artists performing for free. Filipinos along with ordinary people from around the world rallied to aid the Philippines.

In the Education cluster, PDRF reconstructed dozens of classrooms and, at the request of the Department of Education, fed 27,000 hungry schoolchildren

in 607 schools for one month. In the Livelihood cluster, it worked with the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) on a programme to restart businesses that had been lost during Haiyan. The DTI chose the recipients most likely to succeed and trained them while PDRF provided the equipment to get their businesses going again. Dressmakers were given sewing machines. Food stall owners were given stoves and cooking utensils to put up sidewalk eateries. PDRF gave motorized boats to fishermen who had lost theirs, to enable them to earn a living again. Small stores, called 'sari-saris', that had been swept away by the typhoon were connected to a wholesale grocery distribution group that provided them with goods to sell with no cash up front and generous repayment terms. Everywhere, PDRF spread hope and opportunity.

The Shelter cluster built transitional housing for typhoon victims, getting them out of shelters and bunkhouses. In a United States Agency for International Development-funded project, PDRF is constructing a village outside of Tacloban where typhoon victims can live. The plan features a community-owned transportation network to bring people to and from their places of work. The programme also has a livelihood and skills training component. In Zamboanga, PDRF partnered with Gawad Kalinga, a housing advocate, to build permanent houses for refugees from the fighting.

In the WISH cluster, the organization worked with UNDP to pay Tacloban residents to clear debris from city streets. It rebuilt health and birthing centres.

PDRF is making use of telemedicine to enable patients in Leyte, many of whom have never seen doctors before, to be diagnosed by specialists thousands of miles away at the Makati Medical hospital through the magic of the Internet. Hewlett-Packard donated two e-health centres, the first in use outside of India, equipped with modern technology. Smart provided the Internet connectivity, Makati Med the doctors and the local governments of Tacloban and Biliran Island, Leyte the civic health workers manning the centres. This is a truly cooperative effort that is making people healthier.

In the Environment cluster, PDRF cobbled together another coalition, much as it did with the Marikina watershed, to plant mangroves to replenish fish colonies and protect coastal communities from the destructive storm surges that claimed the lives of thousands in Tacloban.

As for Disaster Preparedness, PDRF is building top-of-the-line, two-story evacuation centres, self-contained and sturdy. Residents continue to be plagued by fear each time it rains and the centres serve as arks where nearby communities can flock to during future storms.

PDRF has partnered with the Canadian Emergency Risk Management firm to train first responders from both the private and public sectors, including those from Zamboanga and the Philippine National Police, in fire

safety, earthquake retrieval and other crisis situations.

The most notable project of the Disaster Preparedness cluster is the construction of the world's first privately run and funded disaster operations centre (DOC). The centre will be located near Clark Airport, outside of Manila, with an initial office at the Shell House in Makati, another PDRF member. The goal will be to coordinate the preparedness and recovery efforts of the private sector during future crises, strengthen the resilience of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) and support the Philippine Government in its relief work.

As part of its mission, the DOC sponsors a PrepLab

pinas, a consortium established by another of its members, Aboitiz Foundation. It will soon give courses in emergency planning and organization along with drills and simulations.

Reflecting a new understanding of the realities of the Philippine milieu and the multifaceted nature of calamities, the board of PDRF recently voted to change its name from recovery to resilience. It is now the Philippine Disaster Resilience Foundation. The new name reflects its new sense of purpose and the determination to make the Philippines a safer place.

Among PDRF's advocacies is the push to establish economic free trade zones in disaster-stricken areas in order

to trigger economic growth and speed recovery. The real strength of the private sector lies not in donations because corporate social responsibility budgets are limited. The true vigor and robustness of the private sector can be unleashed when tax and other incentives are put in place to encourage investment by private companies. This investment will create jobs, encouraging people to return. Workers will need restaurants to eat in and hotels and houses



PDRF opened numerous two-story evacuation centers, like this one at the San Jose Central Elementary School in Tacloban, Leyte which lost 120 students during Super Typhoon Haiyan.

series that offers training to MSMEs in business continuity planning, particularly those acting as suppliers or vendors to 'lifeline' companies. Lifeline companies are those engaged in essential services that people need to survive including water and sanitation, power, telecoms, logistics, emergency supplies, finance and search and rescue. These smaller firms are among the most vulnerable during calamities with many never recovering.

PDRF has formed additional clusters based on the lifeline industries. Sixty-eight companies have joined these groups which have brought together firms from diverse industries to pool their resources to prepare for future crises and to help disaster victims.

PDRF also offers training in the study of tropical weather patterns in partnership with Weather Philip-

to live in, thus reviving the region's economy.

The Philippines has begun to develop a real expertise in managing disasters. PDRF was born from a catastrophe and yet from that horror came a new understanding that the private sector, not just in the Philippines but around the world, has a significant role to play in all phases of a calamity, from preparedness to relief to recovery and rehabilitation. The world of humanitarian action will never be the same again.

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Japan Self Defense Forces provide medical assistance after the 2015 Nepal Earthquake. Photo courtesy of Japan Ministry of Defense

Civil-Military Cooperation Strategy for Disaster Relief in Japan – Missing in Disaster Preparedness

By Atsushi Yasutomi,¹ Senior Researcher, Research Institute for Peace and Security & Saya Kiba,² Assistant Professor, Policy Studies, Doshisha University

The Japanese government has implemented its policy for civil-military cooperation since the early 2000s. It encourages international peace cooperation activities by the Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) in close cooperation with the Japanese civilian authorities and agencies, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private businesses. It particularly promotes

interagency cooperation with all Japanese organizations involved, labeling it the “All-Japan” approach to civil-military cooperation. With some successful “All-Japan” experiences in the JSDF’s recent peace support operations (PSO), the approach is becoming a basis for all types of JSDF civil-military cooperation activities abroad. While the “All-Japan” approach may suit the context of (PSO),³ applying it to JSDF’s overseas disaster relief activities is misleading. The Japanese authorities must acknowledge that these two civil-military cooperation contexts are distinct from each other. Because of this confusion, civil-military cooperation strategy for disaster relief is absent in the JSDF. In order to solidify the JSDF’s disaster preparedness, efforts need to be specifically target civil-military cooperation in the overseas disaster relief contexts.

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³ Peace Support Operation (PSO) is defined as multi-functional operations involving military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies that are generally designed to achieve a long-term political settlement or other specified conditions, often in support of international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). NATO, Peace Support Operations, AJP 3.4-1, July 2001.

PSO to Disaster Relief: Fallacy of Applying the Civil-Military Cooperation Strategy

There is a strong expectation within the Japanese government for the JSDF to perform civil-military cooperation during disaster relief activities abroad in the same format as done in PSO.

Civil-military cooperation in each discrete disaster relief and PSO environment has its own distinct purposes, roles, significance, challenges, philosophy, and disciplines. Because of very distinctive natures, the two civil-military cooperation contexts are hardly discussed in the same perspective. However, the understanding of civil-military cooperation in Japan's disaster relief context is often mixed with that of the PSO context. Such confusion is observed in the following three dimensions:

1) Confusion at the Policy Level

Since 2002, at least eight government policy documents and strategic papers have been released, forming the government's foreign and strategic policy. All these documents stress the significance of, and the JSDF's challenges, in civil-military cooperation in PSO. However, none mention policies towards civil-military cooperation in disaster relief activities (Table 1). Meanwhile, the Japanese government's policy on civil-military cooperation in disaster relief abroad remains unclear.

2) Confusion in the Central Readiness Force Structure and Functions

The mixture of the PSO and disaster relief contexts in civil-military cooperation is also exhibited in the structure and functions of the Central Readiness Force (CRF). Established 28 March 2007, the Civil-Military Cooperation Division (CIMIC Division) within the CRF Headquarters is responsible for the following three major functions required for civil-military cooperation: (a) command of units deployed in PSO and overseas disaster relief operations; (b) pre-deployment education and training on civil-military cooperation; and,

(c) research on civil-military cooperation. It is important to note that each of the three functions cover both PSO and overseas disaster relief activities.

(a) Command

The CRF CIMIC Division in Zama (outskirts of Tokyo) provides operational command to units on missions abroad for both PSO and disaster relief activities. Currently, the CRF's command function tends to be occupied by the works for civil-military cooperation projects under

Policy Documents	Date Issued	Points on Civil-Military Cooperation
1. Report of an Advisory Group on International Cooperation	2002/12/18	- Japan must search for its distinct approach to UN PSOs in areas where the JSDF can collaborate with civilian organizations - In Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), Comprehensive Approach must be pursued whereby the JSDF's engineering activities are supplemented and consolidated by harnessing Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA).
2. National Defence Program Guidelines for FY 2005 and beyond	2004/12/10	- PSO activities should be accompanied and supplemented by Japanese ODA
3. Report of the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security 2008	2008/6/24	- No specific point is mentioned
4. Japan's Visions for Future Security and Defence Capabilities in the New Era: Toward a Peace-Creating Nation	2010/8/1	- JSDF's cooperation with civilian organizations in the areas of humanitarian assistance, post-conflict rehabilitation, and peace building, through which effective inter-agency coordination needs to be developed. - Civil-Military Cooperation has become an important factor in peace building.
5. National Defence Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and beyond	2010/12/17	- No specific point is mentioned
6. Advisory Group Medium-term report on future PKO	2011/7/4	- JSDF should strengthen its PKO's civil assistance functions by utilizing the Japanese ODA in collaboration with civilian organization including NGOs so that the cooperation could involve "All-Japan" actors.
7. National Security Strategy	2013/12/17	- Japanese peacekeeping operation should implement effective coordination with ODA projects and with NGOs
8. National Defence Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and beyond	2013/12/17	- No specific point is mentioned

Table 1: Japan's major policy and strategic papers and civil-military cooperation (Source: authors)

the UNPKO for United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). According to a CRF officer, the CRF's task is so overloaded by the South Sudan projects that only a limited portion of its energy and time is spent preparing for overseas disaster relief activities such as producing and revising the disaster relief training manuals.⁴

(b) Education and Training

The International Peace Cooperation Activities Train-

⁴ Authors' interview, 16 January 2017.

ing Unit, established under the CRF at Camp Komakado (100km from Tokyo), is responsible for pre-deployment education and training on civil-military cooperation in PSO and overseas disaster relief activities. The Training Unit has pre-deployment education curriculum such as courses on crisis management, foreign languages, specific knowledge on local culture and religions specifically needed in foreign missions. While this function plays a vital role in preparing JSDF units for missions abroad, the Training Unit's curriculum does not distinguish between PSO from overseas disaster relief activities. Indeed, the Training Unit is particularly informed of knowledge concerning PSO but tends to lack knowledge on fundamentals of overseas disaster relief activities such as the U.N. Cluster System, the roles of the Multi-national Coordination Center (MNCC) and Humanitarian-Military Operations Coordination Centre (HuMOCC). For this reason, the Training Unit often needs to be assisted by external civil-military cooperation experts (civilian) specially commissioned by the CRF CIMIC Division in Zama.⁵

(c) Research

Although the CRF is tasked to conduct research on disaster relief, a structured research format is absent to date. Unlike the Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center (JPC), which assumes the research functions on the JSDF's PSO activities, no such research center is present within the JSDF to conduct research for the improvement of overseas disaster relief activities. A CRF officer explains that the Ministry of Defense (MoD) tends to put more emphasis on the JSDF's PSO issues that are relatively more politically salient. Any initiative for research on disaster relief activities abroad is often de-prioritized. In the absence of a specialized research center, the CRF CIMIC Division tends to be overburdened by increasing requests for dispatches of Japanese civil-military cooperation experts to foreign countries, as all such requests need to be met solely by this division – the only division responsible for civil-military cooperation in the entire MoD/JSDF structure.

⁵ Authors' interview, 16 January 2017.

Discussions hosted by CRF	Date conducted	Participants	Discussion contents
1. IPCAS 2011 (International Peace Cooperation Activities Seminar)	2011/11/01-02	- Academe as mentors - JSDF, NGO, ICRC, UNOCHA, JICA, researchers, MoD	- Lessons learnt from the South Sudan activities and cooperation with local NGOs
2. IPCAS 2012	2012/12/18-19	- Academe as mentors - JSDF and NGO staff as presenters, JSDF NGOs, ICRC, UNOCHA, JICA, researchers, MoD, MoFA	- JSDF-NGO Cooperation in PKO
3. IPCMCS (International Peace cooperation activities Civil-Military Cooperation Study)	2014/03/04	- JSDF, JICA and NGOs as presenters - CRF commanders, JSDF, NGOs, ICRC, JICA, researchers, MoD, MoFA	- JSDF-MoFA-JICA-NGO Cooperation in PKO in South Sudan - Lessons learnt from Typhoon Haiyan relief operation and JSDF-JICA cooperation
4. IPCMCS (International Peace cooperation activities Civil-Military Cooperation Study)	2015/03/03	- WFP as keynote speaker, JSDF, NGOs, ICRC, JICA, researchers, MoD, MoFA	- UN cluster meeting in multinational relief operation abroad and civil-military cooperation
5. IPCMCS (International Peace cooperation activities Civil-Military Cooperation Study)	2016/03/7	- UNOCHA as keynote speaker, JSDF, NGOs, ICRC, JICA, researchers, MoD, MoFA, UN organs	- Civil-military cooperation in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

Table 2: Civil-military cooperation studies and seminars hosted by the CRF CIMIC Division since 2011

Furthermore, while lessons learnt studies in the CRF's CIMIC Division are conducted on a regular basis, the two distinct civil-military cooperation contexts are often mixed in their discussions.

The Division has hosted a number of workshops and table-top exercises on the JSDF's on-site cooperation with civilian organizations during its missions abroad since 2009 (Table 2). Throughout these opportunities, challenges in and lessons learnt from civil-military cooperation in peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief activities were discussed. In these discussions, experiences from the JSDF's cooperation with NGOs in South Sudan during its PKO mission were compared with lessons learnt from the Typhoon Haiyan case in the Philippines in 2013.

Sharing valuable experiences and lessons that can be commonly identified through the two types of civil-military cooperation activities is an important exercise. Nevertheless, these discussion opportunities fail to clarify the distinct natures of the civil-military contexts.

3) Confusion in the Self Defense Forces Laws

Japan's confusion over civil-military cooperation contexts comes also from the fact that the Self Defense Forces Law provides blurred definitions and cross-labeling of missions on "international peace cooperation" that mingles PKO activities with disaster relief activities.

Article 3 of the Self Defense Forces Law identifies the JSDF's three primary missions as: (1) defense of Japan and the maintenance of public order; (2) activities in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan; and, (3) international peace cooperation activities.⁶ This third mission is further specified in the two separate acts consisting of two activities: a) international peace cooperation duties such as United Nations peacekeeping operations based upon the “act concerning Japan’s

appropriate strategy for disaster relief, at least the following three steps need to be considered.

First, the fundamental knowledge about civil-military cooperation needs to be taught amongst lawmakers and JSDF officers in Japan. Foremost, that the fundamental philosophy, strategy, and objectives of civil-military cooperation in disaster relief differs from those in the PSO context, and that they must be treated differently. Particularly, these decision makers must know that the civil-military cooperation in disaster relief context is not an objective in itself but is a means to achieve prompt and effective cooperation with civilian actors in a time-constrained environment with limited resources available. This is utterly distinct from PSO civil-military cooperation strategy that seeks to pursue strategic national interest in cooperation with civilian actors within a much longer timeframe.

Second, there is a need for a serious review of the education and training for disaster relief. As observed above, the CRF CIMIC Division is providing pre-deployment education and training on civil-military cooperation for both PSO and disaster relief activities. The CRF, often overburdened by PSO-related activities has little spare time and energy to teach even fundamental issues such as the roles of the MNCC and HuMOCC. This has undermined the disaster relief pre-deployment education on civil-military cooperation.

Third, institutional memory needs to be built in a structured way to improve civil-military cooperation in disaster relief. The CRF, already overloaded with other civil-military cooperation activities, is under-budgeted and under-staffed to perform effective institutional memory building on civil-military cooperation activities from past disaster relief deployments in the Asia-Pacific. A separate center should be established to undertake research and develop training materials for this purpose.

Japan’s strategy for civil-military cooperation in disaster relief cannot simply mirror overseas PSO contexts. In order to solidify the JSDF’s disaster preparedness, renewed efforts are needed to build appropriate civil-military cooperation strategy specifically targeted to overseas disaster relief activities.



Fig. 1: International Peace Cooperation Activities Conducted by the JSDF [Source: Ministry of Defense (2015) Defense of Japan (Annual White Paper) 2015, p.297]

cooperation in the UN Peacekeeping Operations and other operations”; and, b) international disaster relief operations to respond to large-scale disasters overseas based upon “act concerning the dispatch of international disaster relief teams” (fig.1). The Self Defense Force Law refers to these two distinct forms of international contribution to missions as “international peace cooperation activities” [authors’ emphasis]. The Self Defense Force Law treats the JSDF’s disaster relief mission as one form of contribution to international peace.

First Steps to Civil-Military Cooperation Strategy for Disaster Relief

Applying the PSO’s civil-military cooperation strategy to the disaster relief contexts is misleading, and consequently, the JSDF’s civil-military cooperation strategy for disaster relief is absent. To build an

⁶ First enforced on 9 June 1954, last amended on 30 September 2015.



A Road to Safety

Government-to-Government Partnership Helps Build Critical Infrastructure in Bangladesh

By Dena O'Dell, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers-Alaska District

In early 2016, Mitch Nelson heard a story that moved him.

As an agriculture development officer with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Nelson was part of a team interviewing local villagers in Jessore, Bangladesh.

The residents told him the story of a pregnant woman who died during childbirth in July 2015 because the road to their village was impassable by rain and mud. Not only could an ambulance not reach her, they couldn't carry her to safety or get her help.

In a village in Barisal, Bangladesh, residents face a similar situation. A dirt road is their only path to a primary school and cyclone shelter. During large rain storms, both facilities are rendered useless as the road quickly turns to heavy clay and mud.

During the rainy, monsoon season – typically from June to October – dirt roads in rural areas of the country are almost impassable, making it difficult for farmers to get their crops to the market, children to get to school, and for the local populace to get to emergency cyclone shelters or receive emergency care.

Under the U.S. government's Humanitarian Assistance Program, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers-Alaska District's Asia Office is collaborating with USAID and the Local Government Engineering Department (LGED) of Bangladesh by assisting with the construction of roads, market places and irrigation projects in the first government-to-government agreement in the country.

The government-to-government effort puts the execution of the work in the hands of the host nation.

"The partnership allows the U.S. to work alongside host nation governments, assisting them in taking ownership of the projects," said Mike Macmillan, chief of the Alaska District's Asia Office. "The capacity-building practice allows host nation countries to become self-sufficient."



(Above) Before and after photos of a road in Jessore, Bangladesh that was paved by a joint project with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers-Alaska District's Asia Office, U.S. Agency for International Development and the Local Government Engineering Department of Bangladesh in 2015. (Top right) Unpaved roads become impassable during the rainy season making it difficult or impossible for farmers to get their crops to the market, children to get to school, and for the local populace to get to emergency cyclone shelters or receive emergency care.



The Corps' role in the process is to assist LGED with developing, reviewing and accepting the design standards and cost estimates for the projects, as well as to oversee LGED's quality assurance program, and inspect and accept the completed work.

So far, the program has exceeded expectations, Nelson said.

"It has allowed us to take this project to a higher level beyond just a (government-to-government) agreement," he said. "It has allowed for a synergistic effect with LGED being so impressed with learning from (the Corps) that it wants to expand these concepts to other projects."

Since the program's inception in 2012, six roads have been built in Jessore, Bangladesh, and the construction of 30 more roads is underway, said Rob Leach, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers project manager with the Alaska District's Asia Office.

The roads in Jessore and Barisal are among those selected for improvements to support agricultural development under USAID's Feed the Future program, said Leach.

Funds from the program are used to rehabilitate and upgrade union and village-level earthen roads, upgrade and construct agricultural markets and collection centers, and to improve farm-level irrigation and drainage systems.

"Although these roads were selected primarily as infrastructure improvements to support agricultural development under USAID's Feed the Future program, the benefits go way beyond enhancing agriculture," Leach said. "These roads are constructed to resist seasonal flooding, as well as severe storm events. Where roads have been improved, residents now have reliable access to emergency services under all conditions."

The importance of the road construction to the

villagers became evident when Nelson and his team went to scope the Barisal road.

"The entire village waited for our scoping of the road in 100-degree-plus heat all day to greet us," he said.

The road is expected to be completed in June.

The government-to-government agreement has been extended for two years – through December 2018 – to allow for 44 kilometers of roads, 18 market and collection centers and 1,000 hectares of irrigation to be constructed.

The key to accomplishing a successful mission is working with committed individuals, Leach said, who described all of his counterparts in Bangladesh as conscientious, capable, innovative and committed.

"We work with some of the best people in Bangladesh," he said. "LGED has really shown commitment to continue and be innovative in terms of how it meets standards."

Additionally, Leach said he would like to see the government-to-government concept expand in the future for the delivery of other forms of aid.

"We're in the business of delivering humanitarian assistance," he said. "That's the whole mission of the (USACE Alaska District's) Asia Office. This is a different model, but nonetheless, it's a legitimate way to deliver. This is a very good model because it helps develop the capacity of the host nation to deliver for itself."

The Pacific Ocean Division of the Humanitarian Assistance Program, which oversees the Alaska District, has executed more than 60 humanitarian assistance construction projects and conducted more than 70 partner capacity-building activities in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Some tangible symbols of its commitment of humanitarian assistance include schools, shelters, clinics and bridges.



Interview with Adelina Kamal, Acting Executive Director of the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Centre

LIAISON Staff

Adelina Kamal began her career with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Secretariat in 1994, turning down opportunities in the private sector to accept the challenge of working for an international organization with a dynamic mission. In '97, Indonesia experienced its biggest environmental disaster in recorded history as forest fires burnt millions of acres and winds blew haze across neighboring nations. It was Kamal's first experience with disasters, and she quickly learned how complex natural disasters could be. Her first disaster would not be her last, and in early 2004 the ASEAN Secretary General assigned her a portfolio on disaster management. Since then she has been an integral part of ASEAN's push forward toward building a long-lasting "One ASEAN, One Response" disaster response agreement and operational procedure.

Eleven years later she was leading response operations for Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar, opening the door and establishing the ASEAN's humanitarian coordinating office there. She also operationalized the ASEAN-led mechanism in Myanmar, and played a significant role in the establishment of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management or AHA Centre.

Today, she engages regional partners to build upon the concept of "One ASEAN, One Response" with the aim of the AHA Centre becoming the global reference and a global leader in disaster management.

LIAISON: You were a part of the creation of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response, or AADMER. Can you explain the essence of the agreement and what was the motivation behind it?

Adelina Kamal: Before the 2004 tsunami, there was a discussion on an ASEAN regional program on disaster management, the focus being an instrument that allowed cross-boarder movement to respond to disasters. There were not many examples available, not even the E.U. had a comprehensive agreement. So it was not easy, but there were enough instances to build upon. For example, some countries in ASEAN were already engaging in bilateral arrangements in natural disasters - Indonesia and Malaysia, Brunei and Malaysia, Malaysia and Singapore - but not involving all 10 countries.

Three weeks prior to the Indian Ocean Tsunami the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) met to discuss the AADMER. Resulting from workshops and together with the member states we came up with a draft AADMER. Then we felt we had to get the ASEAN ministers blessing to start the negotiation process on the agreement.

After the tsunami, there was a special summit in Jakarta. The ministers had told us in early December to finish the AADMER within a year, but then the leaders wanted us to expedite it because everyone was afraid that there would be another tsunami. Led and hosted by Indonesia, the summit set the highest level of coordination for both the response and recovery. The agreement was finalized and negotiated in just four months, which was quite an achievement. We are talking about a regional agreement here, a legally binding instrument being negotiated and adopted in July 2005, four months after the worse tsunami struck many of the ASEAN countries. It was one of the fastest negotiated ASEAN agreements ever.

L: Did the AADMER lead directly to the creation of the AHA Centre?

AK: The AHA Centre concept originated during the negotiation. The first draft of the AADMER that went to the ministers didn't have the AHA Centre in it. During the negotiation process, countries said, "we need to have something full time. We need an original coordinating centre." So the idea of the AHA Centre was born. Also, during the negotiation process, some countries like Indonesia and Thailand were still conducting their response (to the tsunami) and entering the recovery phase. The need for a coordination centre came from this experience.

So, there was an article in the (AADMER) agreement that talked about the establishment of the AHA Centre, but for an agreement to enter into force, it needs to be ratified by all 10 countries. It took the 10 countries, all together, four years for the agreement to be ratified in 2009.

L: Would you describe the concept and role of the AHA Centre?

AK: During the negotiation process there were a lot of options. The countries decided that it had to be a regional coordinating centre. The AHA Centre will not replace the role of the affected country to provide assistance to the affected population within a country. The agreement says that the Centre will help facilitate and coordinate the co-operation among the countries. In the event of a disaster it will provide support when there is a request or when our offer is accepted by an affected country.

The Centre was established in 2011. Within the five years of our operation, we have responded to 15 disaster emergencies, plus five preparedness missions. When we talk about preparedness missions, we mean, for example, Typhoon Rammasun in Vietnam or floods in the Mekong region that didn't require the full scale of assistance.



Adelina Kamal gave welcoming remarks at the AHA Centre's Emergency Operations Centre in March 2017. The AHA Centre acts as a regional coordinating mechanism for ASEAN nations during disaster response missions.

L: What is the "SASOP" and why do you believe it is an important step?

AK: In the years between 2005-2009 when the AADMER was being ratified, the ACDM was building the foundation for the AHA Centre – like the SASOP (ASEAN Standby Arrangements and Standard Operating Procedures), regular exercises like the ARDEX (ASEAN



AHA Centre

ASEAN and AHA Centre leadership work to ensure policy like the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) remains relevant well into the future.

Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise). The first ARDEX was held right after the signing of the agreement in 2005. The SASOP was already drafted as part of the ARDEX. So, within four years, while waiting for the ratification process to be completed, the ASEAN countries were already putting into place things that would prepare for an operational AHA Centre. We didn't wait for the AHA Centre to be established to create the elements required for it.

The SASOP is a standard operating procedure that will tell the AHA Centre and ASEAN countries how to make a request if there is a disaster, how we will make an offer of assistance, how communications will be managed, what forms to use when. The SASOP has the forms, the flow charts, and the details of what to do during a disaster and after the deployment process; basically, it further operationalizes the AADMER. The AADMER has articles that reference assessment, deployment, demobilization – all the things it needs as an agreement. So, the SASOP says how it all should happen and discusses all the details of assistance.

L: You recently worked on the creation of “chapter six” in the SASOP. Can you explain what that is?

AK: Actually, the idea to create chapter six was already in the SASOP when it was developed. Chapter six talks about military to military engagement, and we needed input and involvement from our military and defense

counterparts. Chapter six discusses how we could utilize military assets in AADMER, and in deployments of assistance to affected countries. AADMER recognizes both civilian and military assets; it talks about these assets as a whole of government approach.

Further, we need to see how the militaries can work among themselves and how they can provide assistance, assets and capabilities to affected countries and to the AHA Centre.

The chapter was created by the defense side, not by (the civilian) side. What was really exciting to see during the process was that they really wanted to make sure chapter six answered and addressed the AADMER and the challenges in it.

L: The ASEAN Militaries Ready Group (AMRG) is a new concept; how do you envision its incorporation into disaster response operations?

AK: The AMRG, just like chapter six, was a contribution by the defense side of ASEAN. It answered the problem that we had: we want to have military and civilian assets respond as one, that is the essence of ASEAN. So the AMRG helped address the AHA Centre's needs and helped ASEAN and the AHA Centre realize the concept of “One ASEAN, One Response.” It also helps the concept of the ERAT (Emergency Rapid Assessment Team) and the ASEAN standby arrangements because it will help determine what specific asset and capability we can

offer if there is a disaster.

Right now the AHA Centre is implementing a new project called the ASEAN ERAT Transformation Project, where we have different levels of ERAT. Level one is the basic level, level two are the specialists, and level three are the advanced. The military can actually provide specialists and offer support in terms of logistics and transport, things that they normally provide during disasters. So the AHA Centre likes the concept of the AMRG very much because it addresses the needs of the AHA Centre.

L: How does ASEAN fit into an international response and all the coordinating mechanisms that includes?

AK: “One ASEAN, One Response” discusses different levels also. The first level is the operationalization of the AHA Centre that has been done for the last five years. Level two is the stage we are in right now – we are trying to get the relevant elements and sectors to work together, responding as one; we talk about the different ASEAN sectors, the health sector, the military sector, the Red Cross, the private sector all working together. Then, in the next level we talk about the concept of ASEAN plus eight. The leaders of the East Asia Summit have issued a statement having endorsed a Rapid Disaster Response Toolkit based on the SASOP. So there are already high-level documents discussing expanding the ASEAN response outside the ASEAN region within the other eight countries, including the U.S. There is a commitment to broaden the ASEAN response, we just have to operationalize it. Level three is going to be more challenging when discussing the other eight countries. These are things that still have to be tackled.

L: What is the next step for the AHA Centre and what is your vision for the end state of “One ASEAN, One Response”?

AK: Level four, or as I call it X.0, will be ASEAN responding outside the 18 countries, anywhere in the world. It’s not something new; we have done it before in Nepal. The AHA Centre facilitated coordination among the ASEAN countries after the earthquake in 2015.

This is how we can fit into the international coordination mechanics and for that we are working very closely with UNOCHA for interoperability. But while we have responded outside of ASEAN – another example, Indonesia provided a lot of assistance in Vanuatu – we are still building up to being able beyond a case-by-case basis.

Countries in ASEAN are used to being affected by disasters and are used to receiving a lot of international assistance. Now, we are really coming forward and moving into providing assistance to other countries. It’s not the intention of the AHA Centre; it’s the ASEAN countries themselves that want to pay back the countries that have helped them in the past. Right now we are transitioning into a stage where we want to help others and offer our experience.

I think we are going toward becoming the global leader in the case of natural disasters. We have a lot of experience in this region as the most disaster prone in the world. We have to share; we cannot keep that experience and knowledge to ourselves. It is our responsibility to share that with others.

If you are interested in learning more about the AHA Centre, their website is www.ahacentre.org



Adelina Kamal speaks at the Comprehensive Crisis Management Course conducted by Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii.

PARTNERS FOR RESILIENCE

*By Rachelle Anne L. Miranda,
Planning and Information Officer,
Philippine Office of Civil Defense Region 5*

The Philippines has transitioned to a proactive approach of managing disasters, representing a significant paradigm shift over the past ten years. Although the nation has been greatly challenged by the world's strongest tropical cyclones, earthquakes and human-induced hazards, the Philippines uses its renewed strength and experience to intensify the call for disaster resiliency.

The 'new normal' of more frequent and stronger disasters has given birth to innovations and developments in Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (DRRM). These advancements are implemented and developed as the country endeavours to be more resilient; however, the call for DRRM to be a top priority has revealed new partnerships and collaborations around the world. The united



cause creates a strong message of unity in preparation for a disaster, as well as in the response and recovery phases.

Pacific Partnership 2016

Last year, Pacific Partnership (PP), the largest humanitarian and disaster response-preparedness mission in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, stopped in the Philippines. The mission is an annual U.S. Armed Forces led deployment – spearheaded by the hospital ship USNS Mercy – and in cooperation with regional governments, international nongovernmental organizations, and countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Malaysia.

In the Philippines province of Albay, PP conducted various civic-action projects, medical missions, joint

disaster management, health and medical exchanges, and the Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Symposium and Tabletop Exercises.

The Province of Albay is located in the Bicol region of the Philippines referred to as the ‘Vatican of Disasters’. The Bicol region earned the nickname by suffering an average of five tropical cyclones a year and being the home to two of the country’s most active volcanoes. Albay is widely known for its ‘Zero Casualty’ goal during calamities, and being the pioneer for DRRM in the country.

The humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) events were held July 5-8 in Albay’s capital city Legazpi, at the Legazpi City Disaster Coordinating Center. The HADR symposium and tabletop exercises were led by the Office of Civil Defense Region 5 (OCD5),

the lead implementer of DRRM in Bicol and for the Naval Forces Southern Luzon (NAVFORSOL), as part of the Response Cluster. The activity was attended by Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Officers (LDRRMOs) from the cities and municipalities of Albay, DRRM officers from national government agencies in Bicol, key focal officers of DRRM from the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and international military officers from Pacific Partnership.

The symposium set the different roles for the local, national and international groups providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. A highlight of the discussion was the Philippines's Model of Disaster Response, where it was emphasized by OCD5 Director Bernardo R. Alejandro IV that the concept of disaster response during emergencies is through a bottom-up and community-based participatory approach; the barangay (village) level acts as the front line of defense, and response travels up to the city/municipal, provincial, regional and national levels. A provincial level response is triggered if two or more barangays are affected, a mechanism that continues to the regional and national level based on the set minimum criteria for coordination and management. Stated in law and the Philippines' DRRM System, it is the role of the local DRRM Council to take the lead in the prepara-

tion, response and recovery of a disaster. This concept of operations has been implemented since the enactment of the law in 2010.

The Office of Civil Defense shared lessons captured using the 'whole-of-a-nation' approach with the active involvement of the barangay in the response to phreatic explosions of Mt. Bulusan in Sorsogon Province, the pre-emptive evacuations for Mayon Volcano in Albay Province, and the destruction brought by Typhoon Nina (locally known as Nock-ten). The barangay council successfully served as the officials on the ground during the disasters. During the preparatory and response phases, activities undertaken by the barangay council helped minimize the loss of lives, properties and livelihood.

During the PP symposium, Mark Bidder from UNOCHA differentiated how the international community works. He stressed the importance of using the cluster system to clarify the division of labor among aiding organizations by identifying their designated local agency. Through the cluster system, the partnerships established are essential to guarantee that each respective cluster lead tasks responsibilities to avoid multiplicity of efforts and politicization of aid. The system is also relevant given the limited resources available. The coordination and information sharing of the cluster leads



Courtesy Photo

Service members from the Philippines, United States and New Zealand, among others, participated in a table top exercise that coordinated international disaster response to fictional Super Typhoon 'Mahal' and a Mayon Volcano eruption.

are vital in the accuracy and timely delivery of assistance to the affected communities during a disaster. On top of this, the lead agencies at the country level are linked to the global cluster lead based on the local context and agencies' capacities. Hence, it is very significant that the cluster system is established for a more efficient approach to disaster response.

Also at PP, Agnes Palacio of UNOCHA presented on U.N. Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) in which she highlighted the relationship between civilian and military agencies in times of disasters. With the increased involvement of both the civilian and military actors in humanitarian operations, CMCoord is very crucial in providing an interactive avenue between the actors.

CMCoord is guided by three elements: information sharing through a proactive approach; ensuring consistency with the task division and joint planning across organizations; and clear and active communication. Thus, dialogue is necessary among actors to promote the humanitarian principles, avoid competition and minimize inconsistency on disaster operations. CMCoord is a shared responsibility and must be systematic to maintain distinct roles and responsibilities for effective response.

The symposium was followed by the HADR tabletop exercise (TTX) of the fictional Super Typhoon 'Mahal' and a Mayon Volcano eruption which are hydrometeorological and geological hazards, respectively. The HADR participants were classified into three groups: the LDRRM officers, national government agencies and the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The objectives of the HADR TTX were to promote interagency and civil-military coordination among the Philippines, the U.S., regional and international disaster response stakeholders, and to increase mutual understanding amongst militaries and national/international civilian leaders. The objectives set were achieved given the level of interaction among the participants during the activity and the shared practices of the civilian and military participants relevant to disaster response.

The OCD5 and mission counterparts from the U.S. Armed Forces presented injects for the hazards to which the participants provided responses through action statements. The participant's respective offices implemented the responses based on the existing frameworks, processes, standard operating procedures (SOPs) and plans for disaster response. As a result, the activity provided an avenue for the participants to test current plans and SOPs and as well as review strategies. This also paved way for increased exposure of the participants to the international assistance norms and practices, and enhanced understanding of disaster response options and resources for future effectiveness of implementation. However, challenges arose during the TTX due to a lack of established communication and coordination between the groups,

the absence of focal officers from a few key agencies, and the need to enhance documentation. These areas for improvement serve as a challenge and commitment to respective DRRM offices to strengthen systems, SOPs and conduct capacity building initiatives.

On the other hand, the Bicol region is now institutionalizing the Incident Command System as a management tool during internationally supported emergencies and disasters. As part of its capacity building initiatives, a number of DRRM focal persons have undergone Basic and Advanced Incident Command System Courses which are now implemented for disaster management operations and planned events. This will dramatically increase capacity for the Bicol region to respond to future disasters and provide a system that assisting organizations can utilize for coordination.

Pacific Partnership's mission in the Philippines is more than an exchange of practices and the provision of assistance and aid; it is a commitment shown that no one is left behind in the quest to make countries resilient.

The province of Albay, Bicol region has greatly benefited from the experts in the international community as well as showcased best practices in the holistic approach for disaster risk reduction and management.

In disaster response and relief, this example can be replicated. All actors have the same vision of saving lives and providing assistance to the affected population. In the Philippines it's not just the national government or the international community's responsibility to participate, but the responsibility of every Filipino. A core Filipino value called "bayanihan" is a concept of helping one another especially in times of a disaster. The idea of 'bayanihan' is key with HADR in the Indo-Asia-Pacific with the emergence of new humanitarian actors from countries around the world. The enhanced cooperation on preparedness and response strategies through HADR is a component which makes the Philippines' 'zero casualty' goal a possibility and global resilience a commitment. Thus, it gives a clearer perspective in the Philippines' mission to build safer, adaptive and disaster resilient Filipino communities towards sustainable development. Making our call for disaster risk reduction and management a priority is a strong call for partnerships in resilience for all nations.

MYANMAR:

By Dr. Sithu Pe Thein, Senior Humanitarian Affairs Specialist, UNOCHA Myanmar, and Fulbright Recipient, & Maj. Bradley W. Hudson, Regional Army Fellow, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

Myanmar, also known as Burma, has been under a military regime for nearly fifty years. Due to the government's closed-door policy, Myanmar's military, known as Tatmadaw, has been away from the international community for a significant period of time. Additionally, international sanctions have limited the contact the Tatmadaw has with other countries, leaving China and Russia as their providers of military procurement, training and knowledge.

Myanmar Military, ASEAN and HADR

As the first step in reconnecting with the international community, Myanmar became a member of ASEAN in 1997; in 2006, the Tatmadaw joined the ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting (ADMM). Each year the ADMM organizes a regional exercise in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, or HADR, and by 2015, the ADMM had adopted the concept papers on ASEAN Militaries Ready Group (AMRG) on HADR. The final terms of reference were adopted a year later.

In order to fulfill AMRG member requirements, the Tatmadaw worked to increase their knowledge and skills in HADR. Personnel have participated as an observer in the humanitarian assistance component of the joint U.S.-Thai military exercise Cobra Gold in Thailand. Additionally, the Tatmadaw have increased their real-world humanitarian assistance experience by responding to disasters in Myanmar, including Cyclone Nargis in 2008, Cyclone Giri in 2010, and the Tarle Earthquake in 2011. Military units distributed food and medicine, managed emergency medical referrals and removed debris.

The commander in chief (CiC), Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, said in an interview with the BBC, "Since 2011, we have been doing some reforms to the military with the aim of becoming a professional army, a standard army." According to a senior military official, CiC Min Aung Hlaing meant an army that has a role not only in combat, but also in helping the country meet develop-



Applying U.S. Civil-Military Coordination Lessons as an Integral Part of Preparedness



ment and humanitarian needs.

During an interview with Radio Free Asia he said, “(Relief operations) are stipulated in the constitution, which says that the Tatmadaw shall render assistance in times of emergency or natural disasters.”¹

The 2015 Cyclone Komen flooding that occurred in Myanmar provides a good example of an improved whole-of-government domestic response. Myanmar President Thein Sein declared four “disaster affected states” and requested international assistance. During the emergency response, civil society organizations led the immediate response through the local communities, followed by government and international humanitarian assistance.

The Tatmadaw aided distribution of humanitarian assistance to remote areas such as Chin and Rakhine states by providing logistical support through helicopters, military aircraft and military ships during the response. This assistance was provided ad hoc and in bilateral discus-

U.S. Military Forces and Civil-Military Coordination

Recently, the Regional Consultative Group on Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination for Asia and the Pacific identified Myanmar as one of the five priority countries in the region where the civil-military coordination for HADR component of preparedness was not properly in place.

U.S. military forces have been a major participant in nearly all HADR operations around the world, including the Asia-Pacific region where disasters are most prone. Therefore, it is useful to study how U.S. forces prepare themselves for HADR operations, as the findings could then be replicated by other armed forces in the region, particularly for a country like Myanmar.

In order to understand the U.S. forces civil-military coordination/HADR readiness, an online survey was conducted in October 2016, in which 104 respondents took part. While the number of respondents is low, they represent all branches of the U.S. military, with different

Foreign military and civil defense assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of military or civil defense assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The military or civil defense asset must therefore be unique in capability and availability. – Oslo Guidelines, 2007

sion with the chief of the regional command even though there is no institutional arrangement for providing such services to the humanitarian community or other government departments. Some agencies such as the World Food Program (WFP) and Save the Children managed to use military assets for delivering relief items, but the discussions and agreements were made mostly at the local level. This showed a willingness of the Tatmadaw to assist wherever possible, but also made the support unpredictable when military assets refused to provide services due to other competing priorities.

The two important lessons from Cyclone Komen are a) the military is becoming a modernized military, as well as active in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, and b) the civilian authority in Myanmar is still lacking as all the provisions for humanitarian assistance were solely under the arrangement of the military, therefore there is significant room for improvement of civil-military coordination.

¹ Myawaddy 2015 #204

lengths of service and military occupational specialties, as well as various areas under the Unified Command Plan.

The results of this survey indicate that in-class training and exercises do not necessarily explain the significant role played by U.S. forces in supporting HADR. According to the survey, approximately 17 percent of all respondents reported that they are not familiar with the term “HADR” and another 31 percent also confirmed that they have never received any type of HADR training during their military service. Therefore, some deductions can be made as to why U.S. forces are successful during HADR missions and how U.S. forces conduct their HADR missions even though not all U.S. personnel have received HADR specific training.

In depth interviews with various stakeholders, including U.S. service members, the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DM), the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and United States Agency for International Development Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/

OFDA), confirm that most knowledge and skills pertaining to HADR are not acquired through HADR training. Instead, it was determined that most of the skills came from the execution of their daily responsibilities, and the military education and training processes which are already ingrained and transferrable. For example, military personnel with expertise in logistics can conduct the movement of items from point A to B, regardless of whether the items relate to combat arms or humanitarian relief. Similarly, helicopter or aircraft pilots can fly from one place to another regardless of the type of cargo.

This finding is very relevant for a country like Myanmar, where even though Myanmar's armed forces have never received HADR training, their military education and skills are transferable to HADR operations.

Civilian-led Responses

This study also found that when the U.S. forces are engaged in HADR operations, they are always civilian led. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 states that USAID is the lead agency for all U.S. foreign assistance including humanitarian and development. At the international level, the Oslo Guidelines states the nature of military HADR missions is “early in and early out” with “unique contribution within a limited time period.” The military is not intended to be involved in the whole process of disaster relief; the military requirement is unique in nature and


complete when civilian responders can take over the delegated tasks.

As all the overseas U.S. HADR operations result from the request of the U.S. ambassador in the affected state, USAID/OFDA takes the lead role, bringing in their vast experience of humanitarian assistance and relief. They work in close collaboration with the joint task force, which allows U.S. forces to conduct HADR missions more efficiently.

As USAID/OFDA are experts on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts, all U.S. forces do not necessarily need to train on HADR operations but can focus on how military assets can best support civil-military coordination in HADR operations.

Myanmar still needs to strengthen the role of civilian administration in disaster response through the National Disaster Management Committee and clarify the role of the Tatmadaw as a supporting actor. This will then provide all actors involved in a disaster response a coordinated and effective approach with clear roles and responsibilities.

Another important component contributing to the success of HADR operations is the coordination between the civilian actors and the military liaison officer. This partnership ensures there are minimal gaps and overlaps among the actors. This finding also provides important instruction on how the Myanmar military should prepare



The U.S. Department of Defense and United States Agency for International Development Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) communicate on multiple levels to ensure a cohesive response.

and train for civil-military coordination, in addition to their unique skill sets, to achieve successful HADR operations.

In order to improve coordination between military forces and USAID/OFDA, there are humanitarian assistance advisers from OFDA assigned to all unified combatant commands of the U.S. military. This ensures the military understands the role and responsibilities of OFDA as the lead agency and provides a cohesive U.S. response.

In the meantime, civil-military training such as the Joint Humanitarian Operation Course (JHOC) by USAID/OFDA and Humanitarian Assistance and Response Training (HART) by CFE-DM were provided to U.S. forces that are deployable for HADR operations. These trainings increase the readiness of U.S. forces on how to coordinate with civilian humanitarian response agencies such as OFDA, the United Nations and international NGOs, and can again be mirrored by Myanmar.

Recommendations for Myanmar and other Foreign Militaries

The finding of this study will form a basis for a set of recommendations as to what and how the countries in the region, particularly Myanmar, can improve their militaries to provide beneficial HADR support. Best practices and lessons learned from the U.S. military include:

1. Establish and strengthen the liaison exchange between civilian disaster management agencies and the military;
2. Identify the dedicated HADR points of contact or liaison officer in regional military commands;
3. Develop civil-military training curriculum based on the JHOC, HART and U.N. Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination course (UN-CMCoord) for Myanmar's military and civilian liaison officers;
4. The Tatmadaw should organize and actively participate in more disaster response exchange exercises and other regional HADR exercises;
5. Dedicate an authority and have clear guidance in act or law for who should lead and how to coordinate the humanitarian response during a disaster.

While great progress by the Tatmadaw has occurred since 1997, much more remains to be done to become a contributing member of the international disaster response community. By incorporating these lessons from the U.S. military and civilian response organizations, Myanmar can continue to advance its disaster response coordination mechanisms, using the experience of others to strengthen its own preparedness efforts.





THE BUSINESS OF DISASTERS

LIAISON Staff

Natural disaster studies find that over the past two decades 218 million people a year have been affected by these hazards, at a cost of US\$300 billion to the annual global economy. To mitigate these losses, stakeholders have measured their risk, analyzed their exposure and ability to respond, and have built important relationships that allow coordinated action when an emergency strikes. Private sector players must be counted among these stakeholders.

Given the reach of today's corporations and the global interconnectedness of businesses, a disaster in one region of the world affects business elsewhere. Among the most directly affected and implicated are transport, telecommunications and banking entities whose operations and staff are not only a part of communities affected by disasters, but are also useful tools and expert partners during emergency response and recovery.

In partnership with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), one of the most developed programs is Deutsche Post-DHL's (DPDHL) GoHelp Program, which incorporates both preparedness and emergency response. At work for more than a de-

cade, this partnership allows the U.N. to call on DPDHL as needed to provide training and expertise for at-risk-areas airport operators before and during an emergency.

The UNDP-DPDHL joint venture Get Airports Ready for Disaster (GARD) is a series of workshops conducted by DHL airfreight experts and attended by local airport managers, disaster response organizations and other key players. They work through practical processes and conduct formal risk analyses of the airport infrastructure. The result is an action plan to increase the airport's maximum capacity during an emergency. After the initial three to five day workshop, a follow-up (six months to a year later) called GARD Plus seeks to monitor implementation.

"Following natural disasters, airports become vital hubs for the processing of incoming relief supplies," said Christof Ehrhart, head of Corporate Communications and Responsibility at Deutsche Post DHL Group, in a press release. "With sound processes in place at the airport and with the relevant agencies, relief goods and aid can be channeled through airports to reach the affected communities quickly and efficiently."

Working as a complement to GARD is DPDHL's

Disaster Response Team (DRT) network that works in cooperation with UNOCHA. DRTs involve 400 DPDHL employees worldwide; they are specially trained to be on the ground and provide support for disaster-oriented airport operations within 72 hours. This support can include unloading freight pallets, warehouse oversight, inventory management, and ensuring that arriving supplies reach appropriate relief organizations.

Upon completion of their deployments, DRTs feed lessons learned back into the development cycle for GARD. As Rania al-Khatib from DPDHL's Corporate Citizenship team explains, "This ensures the knowledge won by DRTs is implemented in GARD."

And, of course, DPDHL and the U.N. do not act in a vacuum. GARD workshops include a list of invitees from across the stakeholder spectrum

"to ensure a knowledge exchange on the one hand and to develop efficient capacity plans on the other," al-Khatib says. This means that local and national government, security forces, airport operators, and local logistics companies can and do participate in GARD workshops.

While DPDHL's partnership with the U.N. is more than a decade old, it should not be assumed that private sector involvement in the humanitarian and development spheres is no longer controversial.

Historically, corporations have been expected to donate funds or supplies to the community of nongovernmental organizations and humanitarians that respond to emergencies. A corporation that is responding directly may be viewed as acting based on a profit motive

– either attempting to profit from disaster or minimize losses. Thus, gaps in corporate structure and culture remain, as well as trust between the humanitarian community and the private sector.

What has become increasingly evident is that this model is no longer sustainable. The private sector is where improvements in efficiency and innovations often occur, and corporations have crucial expertise in local socio-economic conditions alongside their massive technical capacities. It is reasonable to assume that corporations become stakeholders in disaster preparedness and response when it suits both the company's best interest and the community in which it resides.

However, the reality is that the onus is mostly on corporations. Not only do they need to explain to their

boards and shareholders why they should participate in disaster preparedness and response, but also build trust before an emergency by participating substantively and consistently in the mitigation, development and planning stages.

To address the first issue, DPDHL's corporate strategy incorporates "Living Responsibly," making the GoHelp program a core business activity.

DPDHL is especially exposed to the risks of a natural disaster because it relies on transportation and communication links globally, including in the areas of the world most at risk. Thus, natural disasters can disrupt business by harming or displacing staff, damaging facilities, destroying whole markets and breaking links in supply chains. This type of disruption cannot be totally avoided,




Photos courtesy of Deutsche Post DHL

GARD workshops help airports prepare their staff in high-risk areas for worst case scenarios. The workshop covers group exercises, airport assessment, and action plan and report writing.

but continuity can be ensured. This includes building staff knowledge by practicing disaster response procedures thereby reducing the effects the disruption has on the company over the long-term. Once a staff knows how to implement their own business' disaster response procedures, they can also help others.

With the philosophy of continuity underpinning corporate responsibility programs, DPDHL has moved to address the second concern: building trust.

In 2005, DPDHL signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the U.N. on disaster management. While such an agreement cannot overcome general issues of "disputes over competency or proper information provision" in the midst of a disaster response, al-Khatib says DPDHL's long-term relationship means the humanitarian response community "always



Since 2005, the GARD program has assessed 40 airports in 18 countries.

perceive(s) [DPDHL as a] competent partner.”

With the internal and external foundations for private involvement in disaster preparedness and response in place, and a decade of experience behind them, DPDHL has also collected a list of best practices. Other private sector players are already confirming that these tools address both corporate structure and global engagement to allow systematic participation in disaster risk reduction and response.

The keystone of these best practices is that this type of partnership has to leverage a company’s core competency. The risks are significant if private sector players become involved in activities not related to core competencies because they undermine trust and can disrupt life-saving operations. The UNDP-DPDHL GARD program is clearly defined in the founding MOU. Al-Khatib stresses that DPDHL is careful to structure all participation around its own unique expertise.

“We always focus on our core competency which is bringing in our logistic knowledge to benefit the airports in terms of resources, processes and equipment,” she said. If a potential program, partnership or activity is not a 100 percent match, it is not considered a possibility.

Similar examples of this type of systematic, expert and unique private sector contribution include the involvement of telecommunications and financial players.

The Global System for Mobile Association (GSMA) of mobile service providers, manufacturers and software developers launched the Humanitarian Connectivity Charter in 2015 to lay out best practices to improve communication and information access during a crisis to reduce the loss of life. Predictably, these practices include coordinating among themselves and strengthening partnerships with governmental and humanitarian actors.

Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) have proven this concept works. For example, in Nepal in 2015, MNOs provided free or subsidized service for earthquake-impacted communities and humanitarian providers. They could do so because of pre-disaster partnerships among themselves, equipment companies and public players.

As another example, MasterCard has developed and continues to test methods of payments in a humanitarian context. In 2014, after collaborating with NGOs, the company launched a prototype subsequently tested in Yemen by Save the Children, to support a USAID Food For Peace Program. By ensuring that implementing partners and target communities could use an electronic payment system to facilitate food delivery and receipt, MasterCard and Save the Children proved that conflict-ridden societies with devalued currencies can still participate in the global economy. For MasterCard, the benefit is not only philanthropic but also that the company learns more about the markets where it operates. It develops the technology and staff expertise to manage new capabilities both during disasters and in the course of regular business.

In all of these cases, well-defined business reasons for participating in disaster risk reduction and response underpin strong partnerships and successful collaboration. Those private sector players whose businesses depend on global connectivity and movement are at the forefront of public-private collaboration to mitigate the effects of disasters and to respond when disasters occur. This type of collaboration likely will expand as public budgets dwindle, NGOs are over-stretched, and the number and severity of disasters grow. Consequently, private corporations are pushing preparedness and response efforts to more innovative and aggressive results, benefiting not only themselves, but also the people and communities most at risk.

From Vacation Home to Emergency Shelter:

Airbnb Engages in Disaster Preparedness and Response



Airbnb partners with the American Red Cross to provide free emergency preparedness trainings to hosts. Training shows how hosts can be prepared in case of a disaster, including how to develop a disaster plan, how to build an emergency supply kit, and specifics about potential hazards that could impact their region.

LIAISON Staff

Earthquakes, wildfires, floods, hurricanes, tornadoes and heat waves – the U.S. alone has more than 100 disasters which meet the criteria for a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) declaration each year, while the U.N. Office for International Strategy for Disaster Reduction records hundreds of international disasters that kill more than 20,000 people annually.

Many other emergencies do not reach the level of severity to receive a federal declaration or international assistance, but still involve responses by public, non-profit and private actors. These partners collaborate on shelter, transportation, communication and rebuilding lives without major funding appeals or disaster grants. Instead, they rely on volunteerism, community-minded businesses and resiliency.

In smaller emergencies these partners often know each

other; they live in the same community, patron each other's businesses and attend the same organizations. So, when the time comes to help, they open their homes to each other. One company is making communities of all sizes feel like small ones by bridging the gap between people who offer shelter and those who need it: Airbnb.

We know them for vacation rentals or apartments that make long business trips bearable. We don't think twice about popping open the app on our smartphone or tablet to browse what is available for an impromptu weekend away. These very vaca-

tion homes may also be available when disaster strikes; they can shelter people who lose their homes or those who arrive to help.

The 2012 multi-state disaster caused by Superstorm Sandy was one of the first illustrations of this network in action. Hosts registered with Airbnb sought to give shelter to those affected by the storm by using the peer-to-peer (P2P) accommodation site. They just did not want to be required to pay fees or to charge those who were displaced – and Airbnb helped them do it. After Sandy, it became clear that an ad hoc arrangement put in place when disasters occur was insufficient. There needed to be policies in place, and hosts needed to be supported before, during and after emergencies.

Kellie Bentz, head of Global Disaster Relief and a veteran NGO staffer on several domestic disaster responses now heads the Airbnb Disaster Response Program. Among the first steps in creating a dedicated set of policies and operations, the company created the in-app

disaster response tool, activated when disasters occur. When notified of an emergency situation, the company emails hosts in the affected area to offer them the option of listing their properties in a special section of the app. This section allows those seeking shelter during the emergency response period to find free accommodation. The word goes out to the affected community via social and traditional media, and availability is continuously updated in real-time for as long as needed.

While Sandy may have been the impetus for development of the disaster response tool, it does not take something of that magnitude to trigger its use. Since the app tool went live in 2013, it has been activated to address displacement and relief staff inflows during wildfires in San Diego and North Carolina; flooding in as far flung places as the Balkans, London, Sardinia, Texas, Oklahoma and Colorado; earthquakes in Nepal and Greece; ice storms in Toronto; cyclones throughout the Asia-Pacific region; an explosion in Manhattan, and terror attacks in Fort Lauderdale, Paris and Brussels. The company reports that in the 55 times the tool has been activated, 2,000 nights have been donated and 3,000 homes have been opened to those affected by or responding to emergencies.

Five years after Sandy and a decade after the first iPhone, Airbnb is not alone among tech companies and mobile apps to recognize that emergency response is part of what their users demand. Mobile networks and apps have a central role in the lives of many who, in times of emergency, will turn to those networks and tools out of habit. Reversely, social media and online users are merciless in chastising, and boycotting, firms they perceive as uncaring, or worse, profiting from misfortune.

Despite the clear benefit to a brand's reputation of being responsive to disaster, the challenge for private companies in general, and with mobile technologies specifically, is to play a role in emergency responses that meet a particular criteria. It must a) be in line with core competencies; b) not negatively impact the core business; c) meet user demands, and d) not be a disruptor, but instead complement traditional emergency response networks and methods.

To date, Airbnb's role in emergency response has very much fallen in line with its core business: providing shelter. Other examples of tech and P2P involvement include Uber's responding to emergencies by waiving surge prices in emergency-affected areas. Major telecoms like Virgin and AT&T have made calling free so that people can get help, notify loved ones and inform responding agencies or organizations during crises. But, to ensure they are separating business from philanthropy and not impacting the revenue-generation portion of the organization, time limits often apply (usually a week from the initial emergency trigger) as does a geographic range where emer-

gency services are available.

Having demonstrated the usefulness of these apps and tools in times of emergency, Airbnb is working to support both its hosts and effectively reduce some of the need for emergency hosting. The company has begun partnering with disaster response specialists and communities to promote awareness and preparedness so that the risks are reduced and the responses more smoothly conducted.

In 2015, in one of the first steps of collaboration between Airbnb and FEMA, Airbnb sent hurricane preparedness information to 100,000 enrolled hosts in hurricane-prone regions across the U.S. The packet directs Airbnb hosts to FEMA's Ready.gov website in the expectation that these hosts will use the site as a resource for simple steps to prepare for hurricane season. In addition to FEMA, Airbnb partners with the Red Cross in 10 major U.S. cities to provide hosts with best practices, and safety and preparedness materials. Beyond the U.S., the Australia government and Auckland, New Zealand council have become partners in safety and best practices in preparation for emergencies.

Thus, Airbnb ensures its outreach complements information and education efforts conducted by long-standing emergency responders. However, the challenge for these partners is that their efforts rely on communities – and in Airbnb's case, hosts – being proactive and taking seriously the risks they face. As recently as 2015, FEMA estimated that 60 percent of U.S. citizens were not prepared for a disaster. That accounted for U.S. citizens in their home areas, not those who may be travelling. Airbnb faces the same uphill battle as other first-responders and disaster preparedness partners in encouraging hosts to prepare for emergencies in their communities and to address the needs of visitors.

Airbnb's stated goal is to activate private sector liaisons within FEMA and other agencies to collect real-time information during disaster situations in order to more effectively deploy the disaster response tool. To further this goal, the Global Disaster Relief section of the company has become increasingly active in participating in disaster response exercises, such as that held by the London Fire Brigade in February 2016. Although the effort is still in its infant stages, repeated collaboration in preparedness exercises may be the key to Airbnb's and other private sector involvement in emergency response.

Building experience and direct knowledge as well as personal connections to first responders is expected to allow swifter and more effective action in times of crisis. In this way, the private sector, sharing economy and social media are all moving toward complementing public agency and NGO action. However, well-oiled and smooth cooperation will still take time, not to mention proactive engagement from at risk communities.

TRAINING

Together for Operational Effectiveness

By Elizabeth Kunce-Wagner, Ph.D., Training Manager, Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance & Vincenzo Bollettino, Ph.D., Director, Resilient Communities Program, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative

While a military's primary mission is war-fighting, more and more frequently military deployments occur in the midst of a large-scale humanitarian crisis. Whether the long-term devastation of the 2010 Haiti Earthquake, the ongoing Syrian Civil War, or the 2013-16 West African Ebola outbreak, civilian and military actors are frequently working within a shared operational space.

Globally, humanitarian needs have consistently increased over the past decade and the funding available to meet those needs has not kept pace.¹ Stephen O'Brien, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, noted in his keynote address at UNOCHA's 3rd annual Humanitarian Networks and Partnership Week (HNPW) that focused networking and partnerships are essential to the successful provision of humanitarian assistance at a time when resources are not keeping pace with the demand. To fill this gap, O'Brien remarked that the humanitarian community must find "new ways of working together to meet the needs of the world's most vulnerable."

Given the unique challenges humanitarian agencies face today and the complexities of the field operational environment, education and training have become increasingly important. They provide an essential method of training to both humanitarians and military staff to deliver aid responsibly and to ensure the integrity and effectiveness of their respective mandates. This professional development provides a unique opportunity for academic institutions, and humanitarian and military organizations


to explore how they develop courses and identify core curriculum that enhances needed skillsets and prepares both military and humanitarian staff for future field operations.

These increasing needs require improving the number and variety of educational and training courses for humanitarian organizations and militaries involved in relief efforts.

Diverse actors, their broad range of needs, and the global nature of their staff make the challenges more complex. It will be important for academic institutions, humanitarian organizations, militaries, and training centers to consider education and training needs, but also the most appropriate modalities for providing content. Fortunately, technology and new pedagogical approaches provide opportunities for reaching greater numbers of humanitarian and other global practitioners.

The United Nations' HNPW, held Feb. 6-10, 2017 in Geneva, provided a collaborative forum for international humanitarian issues, including educational needs in the humanitarian sector. One UNOCHA Civil-Military Coordination thematic session focused on learning and training for improved field effectiveness. The session, entitled "Learning Together, Responding Together: Field Effectiveness through Learning and Training," addressed some of the challenges and opportunities associated with matching the needs of a diverse set of actors.

The session was co-chaired by CFE-DM's Director Joe Martin and Anne-Sophie Allegre, Head of the Training and Partnership Unit of the Civil-Military Coordination



¹ Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2015



Elizabeth Kunce-Wagner/ CFE-DM

Joseph Martin, director of the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance, and Anne-Sophie Allègre, head of the Training and Partnership Unit of UNOCHA's Civil-Military Coordination Section, co-chaired a session on training and learning in the information age during the UNOCHA's annual Humanitarian Networks and Partnerships Week in Geneva, Feb. 8, 2017.

Section (CMCS), Emergency Services Branch, UNOCHA. Education and training professionals with expertise in computer-based learning, the private sector, mobile learning, participatory approaches to learning, and simulations and exercises came together to discuss possible solutions to meeting the training and education requirements for the effective provision of humanitarian assistance. More than 100 participants representing a broad range of stakeholders from academia, military, humanitarian organizations, and the private sector took part in this session.

Core themes from the discussion include the accessibility of training, providing joint training opportunities and whether current methods are sufficient to meet the demand.

Training Must be Easily Accessible and Portable

New technology and instructional techniques provide learning opportunities for a global audience that has lim-

ited bandwidth in attending traditional courses. Among recent academic developments like the proliferation of relevant courses offered online, there are asynchronous and self-paced, as well as synchronous courses, that are often offered as part of a blended learning model. Organizations providing these new format offerings include Harvard Humanitarian Initiative; London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine; Humanitarian U; Humanitarian Leadership Academy; Human Rights Education Associates (HREA); Sphere e-Learning; ICRC e-Learning training center and the IFRC learning platform.

There are also new types of instructional formats offered as micro learning, a form of instruction that emphasizes the delivery of content in small, highly tailored and specific packages. These training packages can be accessed via mediums such as YouTube or mobile applications providing

niche training on-the-go. This is appealing for professionals who prefer to direct their own learning experience to close specific gaps in knowledge or build focused skills but have limited time to take traditional courses.

Joint Training in Simulations and Exercises

Militaries are able to allocate significant resources for continuous training to support disaster response operations and traditional war-fighting. Meanwhile, humanitarians spend the majority of their time and resources, not on training, but in the operational phase of a crisis with limited time and resources made available by donors for professional development. The disparity of training resources and time allocated to military forces versus the humanitarian community presents a unique opportunity for civil-military coordination training.

The resources, capabilities, and missions vary for civilian and military actors. Through the evolution of professional standards and guidelines there are com-

mon training objectives particularly related to how civilian and military actors coordinate, share information, and organize for best operational effectiveness in the midst of humanitarian crises. The Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) have facilitated the development of a number of internationally recognized guidelines to improve operational effectiveness of civilian and military actors in shared operational space. Common training objectives and guidelines provide a useful framework around which joint exercises and simulations can be organized.

Every year numerous exercises and simulations are conducted to improve response plans and capabilities for disasters and complex emergencies. Exercises and simulations are areas where both humanitarians and militaries can learn and train together, and are important for understanding how humanitarian civil-military engagement works in the field. Far more attention needs to be paid to increasing the number of quality simulations available for a mixed humanitarian and military audience.

Training Management: Meeting the Demand?

In his closing remarks Director Martin asked participants how the effort to meet training demands could be managed in the future. He challenged the forum of experts in attendance to consider whether a global training cluster would facilitate effective humanitarian assistance and civil-military coordination professional education.

For context, the United States military has 1.3 million active duty personnel and 740,000 civilian personnel. Another 830,000 serve in the National Guard and Reserve Armed Forces. U.S. Pacific Command has 280,000 personnel aligned to it and more than 450,000 of the U.S. Department of Defense's employees serve overseas, both afloat and ashore.^{2,3} Not all of these men and women deploy to disasters or complex emergencies, however the shared operational space requires a standard foundation of the fundamentals of humanitarian assistance and civil-military coordination.

Additionally, there are more than 450,000 field personnel working globally across the U.N. and Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, and over 4,000 international or



Elizabeth Kuncce-Wagner/ CFE-DM

Meeting the future training demands for both military personnel and humanitarians will take innovative and unique solutions as time and resources become scarce.

national/local NGOs operating globally.⁴ Also, the industry has experienced a six percent growth rate over the last several years.⁵

Altogether, the professional education and training needs for the extensive and diverse populations of militaries and humanitarians working globally requires significant collaboration, coordination, and resources. While the "Learning Together, Responding Together" session highlighted a number of opportunities and challenges, the work toward meeting this demand has just begun. The session was the first step in collaborative work towards stronger and more effective civil-military coordination.

2 NOTE: According to 2014 figures from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, there are more than 27 million armed forces globally.
3 USDoD (2017) About the Department of Defense (DoD). Retrieved from <https://www.defense.gov/About>

4 ALNAP (2015) State of the Humanitarian System 2015 Retrieved from: <http://sohs.alnap.org> (Figure from 2013)
5 p. 10 Walker, P. & Russ, C. (2010, April) Professionalising the Humanitarian Sector: A scoping study. Enhancing Learning and Research for Humanitarian Assistance (ELRHA). Retrieved from <http://www.elrha.org>.



AHA Centre

The AHA Centre Executive Programme

Challenges in Training for Regional Preparedness

By Alyssa Lee Gutnik

Disaster preparedness efforts require political will, a significant commitment of financial and human resources, and collaboration between various national level and community level stakeholders. Disaster preparedness on a regional level takes this a step further, requiring collaboration between countries that each have their own disaster response system, differing priorities, and may even operate in different languages. In 2004, a tsunami that killed 230,000 people¹ in the Asia-Pacific demonstrated a regional lack of capacity to respond to a large disaster, and showed how critical it would be for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries to overcome the barriers to regional preparedness quickly and efficiently. The ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management Emergency Response

(AADMER)² was created just seven months after the tsunami in an effort to work towards enhancing regional disaster preparedness.

However, even when important steps such as the creation of guiding documents are taken toward enhancing regional disaster preparedness, the implementation of a robust and successful training program is still likely to face significant challenges. In the following text, we will take a closer look at one such regional disaster preparedness training program, the AHA Centre Executive Programme (ACE Programme). This article revisits a project conducted in 2016 by a team of students from Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs (through a partnership with the DOD Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance). The project was conducted in an effort to identify areas for improvement in the civil-military coordination training area of the ACE Programme. Focus groups and key informant interviews with experienced

¹ Taylor, Alan. "Ten Years Since the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami". 2014. The Atlantic. <https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2014/12/ten-years-since-the-2004-indian-ocean-tsunami/100878/>

² The AADMER is a guiding document on ASEAN regional response. The full text can be found at: <http://agreement.asean.org/media/download/20140119170000.pdf>

disaster response professionals in both Jakarta, Indonesia (home to the AHA Centre) and in Honolulu, Hawaii (home to disaster response professionals with experience in the ASEAN region) provided insights for potential areas of strengthening the training provided through the

established an intergovernmental organization, the AHA Centre in November 2011 as its operational arm to conduct the region's joint emergency operations.²⁴ The AHA Centre is now also home to the AHA Centre Executive Programme (ACE Programme), a training program for

persons who work in the National Disaster Management Offices (NDMOs) in each of the ASEAN member states. This program is a key strategic element to building regional disaster response capacity for ASEAN and the primary aim of the ACE Programme is to “prepare future leaders in ASEAN who are not only highly competent in the field of disaster management, but are also fit to lead with confidence.”²⁵

Challenges and Key Findings

Some of the general challenges facing the ACE Programme are representative of challenges that most disaster preparedness programs face including inconsistent funding, communication barriers, and the presence of divergent political motivations. The key findings explained below were a result of in-depth conversations, focus groups and literature analyses of the ACE Programme and its various stakeholders.

It is important to note that the research team was specifically tasked with focusing on the civil-military coordination module of the ACE Programme, and it is likely that an in-depth look at various other modules of the program would yield additional findings.

Key Finding 1:

Civil-military coordination is regarded as a priority by training participants, and both those in the training program and others associated with it communicated, “the networking between the civilian and military sides was imperative. Communication was important to overcome the perceived trust barrier between military and civilian officials and provide greater clarity on each other's roles and responsibilities and disaster capabilities.”²⁶

Key Finding 2:

The research team identified several areas for enhancement regarding the ACE Programme curriculum design and delivery. Linking classroom knowledge to tangible, hands-on experience is critical and experienced

²⁴ Excerpt taken from the 2016 Report and can be found at: <https://www.cfe-dmha.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=JPr7q6b9gtg%3d&portalid=0>

²⁵ AHA Centre, ACE AHA Centre Executive Programme: Second Batch Completion Report (Jakarta: AHA Centre, 2015)

²⁶ Excerpt taken from the 2016 Report and can be found at: <https://www.cfe-dmha.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=JPr7q6b9gtg%3d&portalid=0>



ACE Programme participants traveled for a study visit to New Zealand, hosted by the University of Canterbury's Centre for Risk, Resilience & Renewal (UCR3).

program. These focus groups and interviews, in addition to a desk review of context appropriate documents, identified challenges the ACE Programme is facing as well as areas for potential enhancement.³ Recommendations for addressing the identified challenges and areas for enhancement were developed specifically for the ACE Programme, but these recommendations may also be relevant for other similar regional disaster preparedness efforts.

Background on the ACE Programme

“The scope and scale of disaster occurrences in Southeast Asia is alarming. From 2004 to 2014, more than 50% of mortalities from global disasters occurred in the region. Disaster fatalities also cost an estimated \$4.4 billion every year to the region. After the devastating effects of the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004, ASEAN recognized a need to find a regional solution to assist affected states that were overwhelmed in their national capacity. Regional consensus among the ten-member ASEAN organization led to the signing of the AADMER in July 2005, which served as a framework that emphasized prevention and disaster risk reduction. ASEAN subsequently

³ Full description of project and methodology can be found here: <https://www.cfe-dmha.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=JPr7q6b9gtg%3d&portalid=0>

disaster response professionals often regard “tabletop exercises” or “scenario-based training” as the most effective way to bridge that gap. “Several respondents in Jakarta also expressed concern that integrating skills and knowledge in a practical way was a challenge. However, it is currently not clear if the ACE Programme is completely meeting the students’ need for practical skills integration.”⁷ Another curriculum gap identified by almost every key informant was that “developing English skills was a priority for the ACE Programme participants and was considered an unmet ‘training need’ by participants, AHA Centre Staff, and U.N. and ASEAN personnel. As mentioned previously, several respondents cited the diversity of ASEAN as a challenge in coordination and developing enhanced English skills through the ACE curriculum was frequently referenced as part of the solution to enhance coordination within the ASEAN region.”⁸ Lastly, participants and trainers appear to prioritize types of training differently, with participants desiring additional training in addressing local preparedness needs and trainers desiring to implement trainings that focus on “executive level leadership and management skills.”⁹

7 Excerpt taken from 2016 Report: <https://www.cfe-dmha.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=JPr7q6b9gtg%3d&portalid=0>
8 Excerpt taken from 2016 Report: <https://www.cfe-dmha.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=JPr7q6b9gtg%3d&portalid=0>
9 Excerpt taken from 2016 Report: <https://www.cfe-dmha.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=JPr7q6b9gtg%3d&portalid=0>

Key Finding 3:

The ACE Programme curriculum has been adjusted over time to reflect feedback from participants, and several critical areas of adjustment were the expansion of the civil-military coordination module and the addition of networking/team-building activities in the latest iteration of the program.

Recommendations


(The following recommendations have been adapted from the original report to apply to a broader audience).

Recommendation 1:

Tailor civil-military training to reflect the national practices and preferences regarding the traditional use of military during disasters.

U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs performs the civil-military coordination (CMCoord) training for the ACE Programme, but the UN CMCoord training does not reflect the AADMER civil-military framework and is in conflict with the traditional role of the military in national disaster response practices in much of the region.

Participants of the AHA Centre Executive (ACE) Programme toured the Philippine Red Cross regional warehouse and logistics hub in Mandaue City, Cebu.



Recommendation 2:

Support networking opportunities and consider the development of a formal alumni program.

One of the benefits of a regional disaster training program is the opportunity for disaster preparedness personnel to build relationships with each other before a crisis occurs. Finding ways to capitalize on the networking and relationship building opportunities that this regional training program offers could help ensure that relationships built during the training program would



Patrick Mongaya

The ACE Programme stresses the importance of strong coordination among national and international NGOs, Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, civil society organizations, donor governments and host governments.

be maintained in the future. Furthermore, it is critical that opportunities for interaction continue long after the ACE Programme in order for participants to continue to exchange ideas, understand clearly each other's various roles and functions, and to be able to act as linkages between NDMOs during times of crisis.

Recommendation 3:

Expand the English for Disaster Professionals portion of the program.

If the ACE Programme is to accomplish its objectives,

it is critical that it ensures that trainees are able to communicate effectively and efficiently both during training and future disaster responses.

Recommendation 4:

Pursue a train-the-trainer model for building capacity within training participants.

The AHA Centre pursuing a "train-the-trainer" model at all levels of the ACE Programme would enable AHA Centre staff, as well as program participants, to build capacity within their own NDMOs even after the program has ended.

It is often a challenge to establish a robust disaster preparedness training program within one country, let alone across a region. The AHA Centre and the ACE Programme should be applauded for their persistence in building regional capacity and brokering agreements across national lines. "The ASEAN region faces its own unique challenges in disaster management and civil-military coordination due to the high frequency and economic burden of disasters and the regional diversity in disaster management and civil-military practices. One of the ways the AHA Centre has sought to address these challenges is through the development of a cohort of skilled disaster management personnel through the implementation of the ACE Programme."¹⁰ The ACE Programme relies on a number of partners for both funding and expertise in order to increase regional disaster management capacity.

Findings that warrant particular attention include the importance of information sharing and standardizing communication between military and civilian entities, the existence of discrepancies between international civil-military principles and the reality of civil-military coordination in the ASEAN region, and a need for enhanced language skills and networking opportunities for ACE Programme participants. Recommendations of ways the ACE Programme and its partners might address these challenges have been proposed. While the ACE Programme does face challenges that are unique, issues of communication, establishing relationships between military and civilian response personnel, and delivering culturally competent trainings are by no measure unique to the ACE Programme. Disaster preparedness professionals may look to the ACE Programme as an example of innovation in regional preparedness efforts, and may also find the aforementioned recommendations to be of use for the enhancement of various other regional disaster preparedness programs.

¹⁰ Excerpt taken from the 2016 Report: <https://www.cfe-dmha.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=JPr7q6b9gtg%3d&portalid=0>



An Introduction to Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

Sgt. Jamie Peters/Royal Army Medical Corps

*By Maj. Pete Hale, SO2 J4 Medical & HADR,
& Country Officer for Nepal,
United Kingdom Joint Force Headquarters*

You're an experienced military officer. You've commanded a company, served in a battalion and brigade, possibly even in a Joint Unified Command. You've seen multiple deployments, including a year in a counterinsurgency role. Now, you've been assigned to a post where you will be planning foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations and have no idea where to begin. Working with a range of civilian agencies, international organizations and humanitarians seems daunting – there are no tanks, fighter jets or submarines anywhere. Yet as an experienced service member, learning the top tips needed to fulfill an FHA role can rapidly dial you into some of the key themes and knowledge sources to set you up for success. And ultimately, your success will translate to a better response to assist those affected by disaster.

Read the Doctrine

Erwin Rommel, the German WW2 general, is quoted

as saying, “the British write some of the best doctrine in the world; it is fortunate their officers do not read it.” Whether we are too busy, or simply lazy, it is often true that we do not spend enough time benefiting from the hard work of others who have distilled their knowledge and wisdom into a Field Manual or Joint Publication. The United States’ Joint Publication 3-29¹ gives a great summary of the context and character of FHA operations, and the introduction chapter can be rapidly scanned at only sixteen pages long. Also consider looking at the United Kingdom’s JDP 3-52² (Disaster Relief Operations Overseas: the Military Contribution) or the New Zealand Defence Force HADR Aide Memoire,³ both of which are well written and easy to digest. But, there’s also a raft of excellent material from non-military organizations that might assist you: The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Civil-Military Coordination Field Handbook⁴ is highly recommended,

¹ United States Joint Publication 3-29. Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_29.pdf

² United Kingdom Joint Doctrine Publication 3-52. Disaster Relief Operations Overseas: the Military Contribution. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/574033/doctrine_uk_dro_jdp_3_52.pdf

³ New Zealand Defence Force HADR Aide Memoire. Available at: <http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/downloads/pdf/public-docs/hadr-aide-memoire-2012.pdf>

⁴ UN OCHA Civil-Military Coordination Field Handbook. Available at: https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/CMCoord%20Field%20Handbook%20v1.0_Sept2015.pdf



Royal Navy

as is the CFE-DM knowledge primer⁵ that will take you from zero to hero in only twenty-nine pages.

FHA is Similar to any Other Military Problem

Planning military operations to provide disaster relief is the same as any other military crisis response. All the experience and knowledge you have built up during your military career can be equally applied to FHA. Your team will need to understand the situation, analyze the mission assigned to you, come up with viable courses of action, choose one (or more) and then proceed to execution. The principles are not new, however the lexicon of FHA may be very different to conventional military operations. The ‘targets’ may be humanitarian needs rather than an enemy structure. The intelligence picture may be more about rainfall and flooding than air-defense networks.

You Will NOT be in Charge

For combat operations, the Department of Defense is the lead government organization setting the objectives and the mission. In FHA, USAID will take the lead and military support will fall in line behind. Similarly, in the UK, the Department for International Development (DFID) leads an international disaster response. Non-military parts of government may be calling the shots, and requesting (and funding) a military contribution to a disaster response. Additionally, the affected nation has requested your assistance, and has a significant vote in the nature and scale of your military response. The point here is that in combat operations you may have significant freedom in deciding how to achieve your mission.

⁵ CFE-DM FHA Knowledge Primer. Available at: <https://www.cfe-dmha.org/Training/DMHA101>

The military is not in charge during humanitarian operations. The host nation and government agencies lead response efforts, providing the military with tasks suited to its unique capabilities.



In FHA it may be more prescribed; you may be requested to conduct a specific task in a specific way, such as the delivery of aid by air from A to B. Not being in charge can be a challenge for some military personnel to accept, but respecting the sovereignty of the affected state, and understanding that the military is in a supporting role, is key.

Different Culture and Language; Different Stakeholders

When military personnel talk about an execution cell or operational termination, they know exactly what they mean. But to a civilian aid agency this might raise an eyebrow at best, at worst it will send them running for safety. Likewise, the humanitarian concept of protection is very different to the military concept of physical protection from a threat. Take time to understand the different terminology, cultural approaches, and groups of stakeholders. The U.N. Cluster system is conceptually similar to the military staff divisional system from 1-9, and many civilian humanitarian crisis responders come from a military

background. You may be surprised at how flat the hierarchy can be for some government agencies and NGOs – relatively junior staff will be empowered to take decisions quickly, and they will be equally surprised at how difficult it can seem for the military to do likewise. When working in a multi-agency and multi-national FHA response, keep this in mind: avoid military jargon and acronyms, and avoid over-classifying staff work where possible; a secret document that cannot be shared with a foreign partner organization will quickly lose relevance.

Unique Capabilities

Sometimes doing nothing, or letting another organization take the lead, can be a difficult concept for military minds. A key principle of military assistance in FHA is that the affected nation's first responders, and the international civilian response community, are better equipped for disaster response than military resources. Humanitarians are trained professionals. While international militaries may provide unique capabilities on request, they must step aside for those more suited to the task of humanitarian assistance. Whilst the U.N.'s Oslo Guidelines make this point clear, Asia-Pacific region often rely on military disaster response more than in other parts of the world. Therefore, when you are designing your FHA operation, always ask what unique capability your military response brings. It may be speed of action, a particular technical expertise, or the ability to move aid where civilian vehicles cannot. If civilian agencies can achieve the same objective, it is preferable to military might muscling in. Instead, militaries from different nations do seem to have a natural ability to just 'get on with it', providing extra utility to military-military cooperation in FHA.

Humanitarian Principles

For those who regularly work in an FHA role, this is commonly understood – humanitarian organizations follow a set of humanitarian principles, a type of doctrinal approach. They will design their response considering humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. The military can never be truly impartial or neutral; it is an instrument of the state with national interests. But, when you are designing your military response consider writing the humanitarian principles up on a whiteboard or on your PowerPoint slide, and keep referring back to them. Work out where your plan may not be in harmony with other responders, and work to mitigate this as best you can.

Knowledge is Power

Understanding the terrain, the adversary and the problem set is an important aspect of any operational

analysis. For FHA events, there are many excellent, mostly civilian, resources available to help you understand the context of the disaster. Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System⁶ (GDACS) will give you a first impression of a disaster as it unfolds. Humanitarian Data Exchange⁷ and Humanitarian Response Info⁸ both have excellent analysis, maps and links to disaster reports. Logistics Cluster⁹ has excellent route, airport and seaport information that will save time in your planning.

Crisis Response – Exploit the Network

Few operational situations demand a rapid response like FHA. There will be a political imperative to act, and to be seen to act, quickly. This may mean committing resources before you've had the opportunity to complete a full and detailed estimate. Getting local knowledge early will pay dividends, so developing a strong network of useful contacts in the pre-crisis phase is key. Consider embassy staff, host nation military liaisons, foreign military crisis responders, and of course the civilian humanitarian disaster response community. Whilst your colleagues may raise an eyebrow at yet another overseas multinational exercise or conference, 'breaking bread' with the same people you will likely work with during a disaster response will provide you with access and information when it really matters.

Get Additional Training

Investing a little time in specific training in FHA or civil-military coordination will reap rewards for your organization. The U.N. OCHA CMCoord course is run worldwide, and is attended by both civilian and military disaster responders. As well as developing knowledge and skills, it provides an excellent networking opportunity with the very people you are likely to meet 'on the ground' during a disaster response. Attending multinational exercises such as the U.S. Pacific Command-led Tempest Express series is equally useful. CFE-DM lists many other courses on their webpage that will be useful to those new to FHA.¹⁰

Any military operator can rapidly get to grips with disaster management and humanitarian assistance. There are plenty of resources out there to bring you up to speed with the FHA landscape, and some excellent courses available to build up your crisis network and confidence. Whilst vastly different in nature to combat operations, FHA is a highly rewarding field, where the purpose of your efforts is clear – the affected population in need of assistance.

⁶ Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System. Available at: <http://www.gdacs.org>

⁷ Humanitarian Data Exchange. Available at: <https://data.humdata.org>

⁸ Humanitarian Response Info. Available at: <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info>

⁹ Logistics Cluster. Available at: <http://www.logcluster.org>

¹⁰ CFE-DM. Available at: <https://www.cfe-dmna.org>



CIVIL-MILITARY INTERACTIONS:

Lessons Learned from a Defense Support to Civil Authorities Regional Exercise Program

By Elizabeth Nathaniel, Analyst, ANSER & Frances Veasey,¹ Principal Analyst, ANSER, & Lead Exercise Planner, Vigilant Guard

In 2004, the National Guard Bureau started the Vigilant Guard (VG) exercise program to focus on integrating the National Guard (NG) with civilian structures during disaster response. The exercise program, now run out of U.S. Northern Command, improves relationships, processes and skills that enable the military to be prepared to assist when disaster strikes. The program has since reached most states and territories, providing training for tens of thousands of NG members and emergency management officials and staff. Our team observed and evaluated 25 full-scale exercises over eight years; several themes emerged specific to civilian-military interactions at the headquarters-level.²

(Clockwise from top left) U.S. Army National Guard photos by Brandon Honig; Spc. Avery Cunningham; Staff Sgt. Eddie Siguenza; Staff Sgt. Ashley Hayes

¹ The authors are employees of ANSER, a not-for-profit public service research institute contracted to develop and execute the VIGILANT GUARD Program from 2004-2012.

² The VIGILANT GUARD Program is not-for-attribution in order to foster a productive learning environment. In this spirit, the authors have not cited specific states or personnel in this review of lessons learned.

A Well-Trained and Properly Supported Liaison Officer is Critical to Success

One of the most important factors enabling the state NG to provide responsive, effective support during disasters is the usage of NG liaison officers (LNOs), particularly those stationed in the state emergency operations center (SEOC). A well-trained LNO with relevant and updated tools (handbooks, capabilities lists, etc.) can overcome many of the systemic and cultural challenges that impede a collaborative response, such as incomplete information or lack of civilian understanding of NG capabilities. Likewise, a LNO without the right level of experience and authority can act as a bottleneck or significantly hinder progress. Often, multiple NG LNOs can prove more effective than one, as the pace of a large disaster can exceed one person's ability to keep up; however, many SEOCs are not large enough to accommodate extra bodies.

NG LNOs continually demonstrate their value in exercises and real-world events; however, states and territories are not consistent when it comes to training or providing the most capable LNOs. Not all state NGs have the staff

available to properly man their LNO position in the SEOC – sometimes only assigning one person with no backup or support, or sometimes assigning people who did not have the training or experience and were essentially “thrown into” the role. In many cases, these assignments were made due to lack of available staff, not out of a lack of under-

NG has enough properly trained LNOs to fill this critical role, even for extended 24/7 operations.

Some states identified creative ways to staff NG LNO positions effectively, improving coordination and communication with their civilian partners. One state NG worked with their emergency management agency to

identify NG LNOs aligned with each emergency support function in the SEOC (e.g. Public Safety and Security, Urban Search and Rescue). These individuals could then provide rapid authoritative answers to civilian inquiries. One state NG used its volunteer reserve component to serve as LNOs in the SEOC, allowing full-time members to serve in other positions in the JOC or the Joint Task Force. In some cases, these individuals also brought a different set of skills and perspectives from their civilian lives that helped improve their ability to work with civilian partners.

Although this is a high-impact position, the value of a well-trained and knowledgeable NG LNO is not limited to the SEOC. County EOCs have requested NG LNOs to increase civil-military cooperation with great success. Some states have robust LNO programs, through which they send LNOs not only



Tech. Sgt. Chelsea Clark/ U.S. Air National Guard

Well-trained liaison officers in the joint operations center are a critical component to effective civil-military coordination during Vigilant Guard exercises, as well as real-world disasters.

standing of the importance of the position. Unfortunately, civilians occasionally misinterpret this lack of experienced staffing as a lack of seriousness by their NG counterparts for their role in the response.

This issue is particularly prevalent during the night shift, as state NGs regularly assigned senior “A-team” staff during the day, and left more junior staff to run overnight operations. For example, in one state, the night shift NG LNO in the SEOC did not know the roles and responsibilities of the different J-code positions in the NG Joint Operations Center (JOC) because that information was not relevant to his usual position. In this instance, his lack of familiarity impeded his ability to act as a bridge between the JOC and the SEOC. Also, nighttime operations are often used for evaluating the past day’s events and planning the next day’s activities, making a knowledgeable NG LNO in the overnight hours a powerful tool in the planning process. Additionally, a formalized training process, handbooks, and desk tools could help ensure every state

to county EOCs, but also to hospitals and field sites to help coordinate civil-military interactions, troubleshoot any issues, and provide regular reports to headquarters. Participants in these types of programs have mentioned that the relationships grew with time, and became more effective as civilians got comfortable working with their uniformed colleagues over multiple planning sessions, exercises, and real-world events.

Effective Use of Web-Based Common Operating Picture Tools Can Facilitate Civil-Military Coordination

Civilian EOCs have continued to increase their use of web-based common operating picture (COP) tools and integrated systems, such as WebEOC and E Team®. Exercise participants generally cite these tools as useful when available, accessible, and functioning. They also note tangible value in allowing NG staff to view and track

requests for assistance to ensure information is accurate, complete, and up to date. However, these tools also came with a common set of issues related to availability, accessibility, and functionality. In many states, the LNO would monitor the web-based COP tool used by civilians, but encountered issues when they needed to readily access specific information. NG staff regularly cited the need for additional training on these systems.

Although issues with forming and maintaining a COP between the civilians and NG seemed to be a reoccurring challenge during exercises, based on after action reports the prevalence of web-based COP tools interestingly did not seem to correlate to significant improvements to COPs over time. This lack of improvement may reflect increasing reliance on the tools without maintaining traditional lines of communication, or perhaps underscores the need to provide sustained training on these tools to larger numbers of NG staff. As COP tools mature and evolve, it becomes more important for NG LNOs in the SEOC to be knowledgeable and trained on how they are implemented by their state.

Organizational and Cultural Adaptations are Needed to Assist Integration

Since the VG program's inception, strides have been made to help better integrate response efforts and en-

sure the NG and other military organizations operate in alignment with civilian guiding principles. NG participants generally recognized the value of having knowledge of the National Incident Management System (NIMS), Incident Command System (ICS), and National Response Framework principles, and suggested that training more NG members on these systems and guidelines would be beneficial to integrating the NG into the civilian response. One of the core guiding principles of NIMS is the use of common terminology, and many civilian and military responders over the years have expressed frustration in decoding the language used by their response counterparts. Because the NG supports civilians when responding to domestic emergencies, the onus is on them to adopt NIMS/ICS terminology; while intuitive and reasonable in principle, such a shift in the NG may be difficult without significant effort.

Another common organizational issue is the need to reconcile the civilian resource request process with the NG request fulfillment process. Civilians request resources using the NIMS resource typing framework. This method expedites resource sharing by categorizing resources by function and type, which reflects the size or capacity of the resource. In practice, the civilian resource request process and the NG's process for meeting requests regularly conflict due to organizational and process differences. State NGs often encounter issues in fulfilling civilian



requests for resources because their civilian counterparts do not fully understand how the NG's internal mission assignment process works. These misunderstandings can cause substantial delays in getting NG assistance. Since the NG ultimately knows best how to direct its people, the NG often requires requests be made for a specific capability, not an asset (for example, a request given as "24-hour security for a 40 square block area for seven consecutive days" as opposed to a specific number or type of personnel to perform that function). Based on the mission, the NG would ultimately decide if they can support the request and what equipment and manpower is necessary to do so. Problems arise as civilian requests are rarely made following this paradigm, and it is impractical to expect SEOC staff to be knowledgeable about the military decision-making process in order to submit workable requests. Rather, NG members regularly identify the need to describe their resources in a way that is compatible with the civilian resource typing system, and to conduct joint training and exercises to test and streamline their solutions. As with many challenges encountered, progress toward this end goal remains varied across the states.

Relationships and Results Improve with Continued Practice

The well-known phrase "practice makes perfect" almost certainly applies to defense support to civil authorities. States with frequent disasters requiring use of NG assets or annual joint exercises regularly performed better than those without these opportunities to work together. For example, shared understanding of the resource request process and how to best request NG resources seem dependent on the previous number of times the NG has interacted with the civilian emergency managers of that state. Although progress toward seamless integration of civilian and military response processes is uneven across the U.S., more exercises and real-world events that incorporate both civilian and NG entities lead to better relationships, more streamlined processes, realistic response expectations, and improved effectiveness of the NG's response.

Vigilant Guard provides military personnel with civil-military coordination experience. The national-level emergency response exercise links National Guard units with the local and national agencies they would support in a real-world disaster, such as state-level Departments of Health and Public Safety, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and local police and fire departments. (Clockwise from far left) U.S. Army and Air National Guard photos by Spc. Avery Cunningham; Senior Airman Jonathon Alderman; Tech. Sgt. Sarah Mattison; Tech. Sgt. Amber Williams; Staff Sgt. Ashley Hayes; Airman 1st Class Jeffrey Tatro.



CALENDAR OF EVENTS

1 **Singapore Armed Forces & U.S. Pacific Command**
Asia-Pacific Military Health Exchange
May 23 – 26
Singapore



2 **Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance**
Health Emergencies in Large Populations (H.E.L.P.) Course
July 10 – 21
Honolulu, Hawaii



3 **Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies**
Southeast Asia HA/DR Workshop
July 18 – 20
Bangkok, Thailand



2
5 | 6

4 **Harvard Humanitarian Initiative**
Urban Humanitarian Emergencies Course
July 26 – 28
Cambridge, Massachusetts



5 **Association of Southeast Asian Nations**
ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) Experts' Working Group on HA/DR
September 11 – 15
Honolulu, Hawaii




6 **Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance**
Humanitarian Assistance Response Training (HART) Course
September 26 – 29
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, USA



7 **Asian Disaster Preparedness Center**
47th Regional Training Course on Disaster Management
November 6 – 24
Bangkok, Thailand





8 **Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance & James Cook University College of Public Health, Medical and Veterinary Sciences**
Health and Humanitarian Action in Emergencies Course
 November 28 – December 8
 Cairns, Australia



9 **U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs**
Civil-Military Coordination Course for the Pacific
 December 3 – 8
 Location TBD



10 **U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs**
Regional Consultative Group (RCG) on Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination for the Asia-Pacific
 December 6 – 7
 Singapore





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